The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from the Corporate Income Taxation by Hansmann, Henry
The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit




Although most types of nonprofit corporations have been exempted
from the federal corporate income tax since that tax was first adopted,1 we
continue to lack a clear rationale for the exemption. This was perhaps
understandable and acceptable when the nonprofit sector was small and
nonprofit organizations were engaged largely in activities of a traditionally
charitable nature. Today, however, the nonprofit sector represents a sub-
stantial and growing share of the national economy. 2 Large concentrations
of nonprofits can be found in a number of vital and expanding service
industries, including education, health care, research, the media, and the
arts. Nonprofit firms now commonly provide goods and services in direct
competition with profit-seeking firms, and in many cases increasingly re-
semble their for-profit competitors in their manner of organization and
operation.3 The traditional criteria for applying the exemption are, as a
result, being stretched beyond recognition, so that the absence of an un-
derlying rationale for those criteria, and indeed for the exemption in gen-
eral, is becoming increasingly conspicuous. To be sure, various efforts to
* Preparation of this Article was supported by a grant from the Program on Non-Profit
Organizations at the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University.
An earlier and somewhat different version of this Article was presented at a meeting of the
Committee On Urban Public Economics and is forthcoming, under the title "Why Are Nonprofit
Organizations Exempted From Corporate Income Taxation?," in the published proceedings of that
conference, THE INTERACTION OF THE PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND NON-PROFIT SECTORS (M. White ed.
1981).
For helpful comments I am indebted to, among others, Robert C. Clark, Russell Osgood, A.
Mitchell Polinsky, Stanley Surrey, Alvin Warren, and Michelle White.
t Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Pennsylvania.
I. See Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Tax-
ation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301 (1976).
2. The best data available, which are not very good, suggest that the nonprofit sector today ac-
counts for roughly 3% of GNP, compared to just over 1% fifty years ago. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 835 n.1 (1980).
3. This is true, in particular, of "commercial" nonprofits, such as nursing homes, day care cen-
ters, hospitals, and publications, which are discussed at p. 59 infra. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at
862-68.
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rationalize the exemption have appeared from time to time. The most
comprehensive and thoughtful of these efforts is presented in a relatively
recent article by Bittker and Rahdert 4 But for a number of reasons the
Bittker and Rahdert analysis, like its predecessors,' is ultimately
unsatisfying.
This Article surveys the various theories that have previously been of-
fered to justify the exemption of nonprofit organizations from income tax-
ation, and discusses the difficulties that those theories present. It then pro-
ceeds to offer a novel, and more satisfying, justification for the exemption.
In particular, the Article argues that the best justification for the exemp-
tion is that it helps to compensate for the constraints on capital formation
that nonprofits commonly face, and that such compensation can serve a
useful purpose, at least for those classes of nonprofits that operate in in-
dustries in which, for various reasons, nonprofit firms are likely to serve
consumers better than would profit-seeking firms.
Although exemption from federal income taxation extends to nonprofit
organizations that assume a variety of legal forms, including charitable
trusts and unincorporated associations, the discussion here will be con-
fined, for simplicity of exposition and analysis, almost exclusively to non-
profits that are incorporated. Since nearly all nonprofits of any financial
significance are incorporated, this is not a serious limitation.6 Further-
more, the focus here will be largely on the exemption as it is applied to
the primary activities of nonprofit organizations; relatively little will be
said about the related issue of taxing, as is now done, an exempt non-
profit's income from wholly-owned businesses that it operates at a profit
primarily to earn income with which to finance its other activities.7 Fi-
nally, although a few comments will be offered about exemption from
other types of taxes, such as property taxes and sales taxes, the analysis
will generally be confined strictly to income taxation, which presents rela-
tively distinct issues.
It should be emphasized as well that the concern here is with the ex-
emption from taxation of the income of nonprofit organizations themselves
and not with the charitable deduction, which allows an individual who
4. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1. See also Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78
YALE L.J. 1285 (1969), which presents a substantially similar analysis.
5. E.g., Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organizations: The Need for
a National Policy, 1968 U. So. CAL. TAX INST. 27.
6. A few substantial nonprofits, including several of the larger grant-giving private foundations,
have been established as charitable trusts rather than as nonprofit corporations. If such organizations
were to be denied exemption, there would be a question of the tax rate to be applied. Should they be
taxed in the same way as private trusts, or rather as if they were corporations? In any event, the basic
issues are the same as for the incorporated nonprofits that are the focus of the following discussion.
7. I.R.C. §511 (tax on "unrelated business income"); I.R.C. §502 (tax on income from "feeder"
organizations).
The Yale Law Journal
makes a contribution to a qualifying nonprofit to deduct the amount of
that contribution from his or her income when computing personal income
tax.' As the discussion below emphasizes,9 the charitable deduction and
the exemption raise different issues, and it would be quite conceivable for
the tax system to embrace one without the other.
Any discussion of the corporate income tax exemption for nonprofits is
handicapped by the lack of consensus concerning the purposes and the
consequences of the corporate tax even as it applies to ordinary business
corporations. 10 Indeed, today the confusion concerning the effects of the
corporate income tax is so great, and the critics of that tax so numerous,
that one might well ask why we apply a separate tax to corporate income
at all, and not just why some kinds of corporations are exempt from the
tax. At present, however, the corporate income tax seems well entrenched.
Consequently, the discussion that follows will take the existence of the
corporate income tax as it applies to business corporations for granted and
will simply ask whether it makes sense to exempt some or all nonprofit
corporations from that tax. As we shall see,1 the answer to that question
is only partially dependent on the theory one accepts concerning the con-
sequences of the tax as it applies to business corporations.
Much of the discussion in this Article is presented in economic terms,
as is appropriate for the subject at hand. Most of the technicalities are,
however, relegated to an Appendix, which presents a simple mathematical
model supporting and illustrating some of the arguments presented in the
text.
I. The Nature of Exempt Organizations
It is helpful to begin analysis with a clear image of the essential charac-
teristics of nonprofit corporations and of the exemption from income taxa-
tion that applies to them.
A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is prohib-
ited from distributing net earnings to individuals, such as officers, direc-
tors, or members, who exercise control over the organization. In the case
of an incorporated nonprofit this "nondistribution constraint" is imposed
by the state nonprofit corporation law under which the organization is
formed. A nonprofit organization is not, it should be noted, prohibited
from earning a profit; in fact, many nonprofits show substantial annual
net earnings. All net earnings, however, must be plowed back into financ-
8. I.R.C. §170.
9. P. 71 infra.
10. See, e.g., C. MCCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? (1979); Stiglitz, Tax-
ation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1973).
11. P. 85 infra.
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ing the goods or services that the nonprofit was formed to provide.1 2
Not all nonprofit corporations are exempt from the federal corporate
income tax. Rather, only nonprofits that are exclusively dedicated to par-
ticular purposes are exempt. The purposes that qualify nonprofits for ex-
emption are explicitly listed in Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code." Any nonprofit corporation whose purposes do not come within
this list is, like a business corporation, subject to income taxation.14 The
list of qualifying purposes is extensive, however, and has been broadly
interpreted. As a result, there are few significant classes of nonprofit cor-
porations that do not benefit from the exemption."5 Indeed, the repeated
and unreflective reinterpretation of the exemption to accommodate new
forms of nonprofit activity,1" which has kept the scope of the exemption
12. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 838. For an extensive discussion of the application of the
nondistribution constraint under current law, see Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law,
129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981).
13. I.R.C. § 501(c) extends exemption to, for example, nonprofit organizations "organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educa-
tional purposes . . ." (§ 501(c)(3)); "[clivic leagues or organizations . . . operated exclusively for the
promotion of social welfare . . ." (§ 501(c)(4)); "[lI]abor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations
. . ." (§ 501(c)(5)); "[blusiness leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate boards, boards of trade, or
professional football leagues . . ." (§ 501(c)(6)); "[clubs organized for recreation [or] pleasure ..."
(§ 501(c)(7)); "[flraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations . . ." (§ 501(c)(8)); "[c]emetery
companies . . ." (§ 501(c)(13)); "[a] post or organization of war veterans . . ." (§ 501(c)(19)).
14. I.R.C. § 11 imposes a tax on the taxable income of "every corporation," without restriction to
business corporations.
15. Automobile service clubs, such as the American Automobile Association and its local affiliates,
are one of the rare classes of nonprofits that have clearly been ruled not to qualify for exemption on
the ground that their activities do not fall within the scope of I.R.C. § 501(c). See Chattanooga Auto.
Club v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1950); G.C.M. 23688, 1943 C.B. 283, as modified by
Rev. Rul. 69-635, 1969-2 C.B. 126.
16. One example of such expansive reinterpretation of the exemption to accommodate new forms
of nonprofit activity is provided by the nursing home industry. That industry was virtually nonexis-
tent until the 1930s; since then, however, it has grown rapidly. See THE NATION'S HEALTH FACILI-
TIES, TEN YEARS OF THE HILL-BURTON HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL FACILITIES PROGRAM, 1946-56, at
83-86 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 616, 1958). Although today the overwhelming majority of
nursing homes are proprietary, roughly one quarter of non-governmental nursing homes (measured
by expenditures) are nonprofit. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1977 CEN-
SUS OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES: OTHER SERVICE INDUSTRIES 53-1-2,3 (SC77-A-53, 1981). Most non-
profit nursing homes receive no significant amount of philanthropic support and provide no meaning-
ful amount of free or below-cost care. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS: DATA FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH
SURVEY, SERIES 18: No. 32, CHARGES FOR CARE AND SOURCES OF PAYMENT FOR RESIDENTS IN
NURSING HOMES 113 (1977) (as of 1977 less than 6.6% of residents in nonprofit and governmental
nursing homes had their care paid for primarily by private charity). Rather, like their for-profit
counterparts, nonprofit nursing homes typically just sell their services to their residents at a price that
covers the full cost of those services. (In other words, they are "commercial" nonprofits in the sense
defined at p. 59 infra.) Nevertheless, the Internal Revenue Service has chosen to interpret the exemp-
tion to cover virtually all nonprofit nursing homes in spite of their non-philanthropic character, on the
ground that they are "charitable" organizations and consequently are covered by the language of
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145. The policy underlying this broad reading
of the term "charitable" has never been enunciated.
Nonprofit hospitals provide a similar example. Until recently, a nonprofit hospital qualified for tax
exemption-as a "charitable" institution under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-only if it provided a meaningful
amount of free or below-cost care to the poor. Since nonprofit hospitals typically were, in fact, philan-
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roughly congruent with the outlines of the nonprofit sector as a whole, 7
offers clear evidence of the lack of, and need for, a coherent policy on
which to base the exemption.
With these basic characteristics of the nonprofit corporation and its in-
come tax exemption defined, we can now turn to a consideration of the
justifications that have been, or could be, offered for the exemption.
II. Do Nonprofits Have Taxable Income?
It has been suggested that nonprofits are granted exemption because
they have no income in the sense in which that term is used in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.
A. Can We Construct a Workable Definition of Income for Nonprofits?
Bittker and Rahdert, for example, argue at length that any effort to use
ordinary tax accounting to define taxable income for a nonprofit leads to
thropic institutions until the 1920's or 1930's, this interpretation sufficed to encompass the great ma-
jority of nonprofit institutions in the industry. Technological and financial changes in recent decades,
however, have changed the character of nonprofit hospitals to the point where the typical nonprofit
hospital provides no substantial amount of subsidized care, but rather offers its services only to those
who can demonstrate the ability to pay for them. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 866-68. Rather
than continuing to apply its long-standing criterion for the exemption, and thus deny the exemption to
most hospitals, the Service chose to reinterpret the term "charitable" so that subsidized care would no
longer be required. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. A coherent rationale for this redefinition of
the exemption was never expressed by the Service. This imaginative broadening of the statutory cate-
gory of "charitable" organizations was challenged, but was sustained by the Court of Appeal, in an
opinion which sheds no light of its own on the policy issues involved. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S.
26 (1976).
The performing arts are yet another case in point. Early in the century, when the contours of the
exemption from the corporate tax were first established, the performing arts were dominated by
proprietary firms; the great number of nonprofit firms currently to be found in this industry is largely
a product of recent decades. See Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing Arts, 12 BELL J.
ECON. 341 (1981). The performing arts are not covered clearly-or, one might reasonably conclude,
even remotely-by any of the various exempt purposes set forth in I.R.C. § 501(c). Nevertheless,
rather than deny exemption to such a large and growing class of nonprofits, the Service chose to
engage in another act of imaginative reinterpretation, ruling that the performing arts come within the
category of "educational" institutions covered by § 501(c)(3). See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii)
(example (4) (1959)) (symphony orchestras "and other similar organizations"); Rev. Rul. 64-175,
1964-1 C.B. 185 (repertory theater). (Although nonprofit performing arts firms typically rely heavily
upon philanthropic financing, the Service was evidently unwilling to extend its definition of the statu-
tory category of "charitable" institutions to encompass them, as it did in the case of nursing homes
and non-philanthropic hospitals. Perhaps this was because performing arts organizations so conspicu-
ously fail to provide services either to the poor or to the public at large-the traditional legal criteria
for determining what is encompassed by the term "charity," see G. G. BOGERT & G. T. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369 (2d ed. 1964)-serving, rather, primarily to provide
entertainment for the well-to-do).
17. As the examples in the preceding footnote suggest, it appears that the exemption has been
kept largely coextensive with the scope of the nonprofit sector primarily through the continual redefi-
nition of the exemption to accommodate it to changes in the activities undertaken by nonprofits, and
not because nonprofits tend to develop or survive only in industries in which the exemption has al-
ready been dearly established. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 882.
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absurdities." Are contributions made to a charity to be included in figur-
ing the organization's gross income? Or should they, perhaps, be treated
as ordinary gifts and therefore be excluded from gross income for tax pur-
poses? Should expenditures made by a charity to assist an impoverished
individual be deductible as ordinary business expenses? Or are they more
correctly treated as non-deductible gifts? There are no satisfactory an-
swers to these and other basic questions, Bittker and Rahdert suggest; the
concept of taxable income developed for business organizations simply
cannot be carried over to nonprofits in any meaningful way."
But Bittker and Rahdert overstate the difficulties. To begin with, many
nonprofits receive little or no income from donations, but rather derive all
or nearly all of their income from sales of goods or services that they
produce. These organizations-which can conveniently be referred to as
"commercial" nonprofits 2°-in fact account for a large portion of the non-
profit sector. 2' They include, for example, Consumers Union (the pub-
lisher of Consumer Reports magazine), automobile clubs affiliated with
the American Automobile Association, the Educational Testing Service,
many private schools, and probably most hospitals, nonprofit nursing
homes, and day care centers. For such organizations it would be perfectly
easy and natural to carry over the tax accounting that is applied to busi-
ness firms, taking receipts from sales as the measure of gross income and
permitting the usual deductions for expenses incurred in producing the
goods or services sold. The resulting net earnings figure could be taxed
just as in the case of a business firm. Since nonprofits cannot distribute
their net earnings, such a tax would effectively be levied on the sum of (1)
earnings saved for expenditure in future years, and (2) net capital invest-
ment (i.e., the excess of expenditures on capital equipment over deprecia-
tion allowances22). Following conventional usage, this sum will occasion-
18. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, at 307-14.
19. Rather surprisingly, the Internal Revenue Service seems never to have addressed, in general
terms, the problem of defining taxable income for a non-exempt nonprofit. One reason for this is
apparently that, given the broad view that the Service has taken of the exemption, see p. 58 supra, it
has never been forced to give the issue much consideration. Conversely, one suspects that the Service
has taken a broad view of the exemption in part, at least, to avoid having to confront the problem of
defining taxable income for nonprofits.
In the few cases in which the Code itself defines taxable income for a limited class of nonprofits for
some special reason, as in the case of certain political organizations under I.R.C. §§ 527 & 4911, the
definition is ad hoc and is apparently based on no coherent principles of taxation.
20. The terminology derives from the classification introduced in Hansmann, supra note 2, at
840-41.
21. In 1976, only 15% of the total revenues of nonprofit organizations came from contributions,
gifts, and grants; 70% came from sales and receipts, and 15% came from dues and assessments. Weis-
brod, Economics of Institutional Choice, forthcoming in THE INTERACTION OF THE PUBLIC, PRIVATE,
AND NON-PROFIT SECTORS (M. White ed. 1981).
22. It is important to keep in mind here that, since we have, for corporations just as for individu-
als, an accretion-type rather than a consumption-type income tax (the difference between which is
essentially that the former taxes interest while the latter does not), see Andrews, A Consumption-
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ally be referred to below simply as "retained earnings. 23
At best, then, arguments concerning the impossibility of applying ordi-
nary tax accounting to nonprofits apply only to nonprofits that receive
substantial income in the form of donations-a class of nonprofits that
will be referred to here, for convenience, as "donative" nonprofits 24-and
not to commercial nonprofits. In this connection we should note that it is,
in fact, not donative but commercial nonprofits that have created the
greatest confusion in applying the exemption. 2- For example, there has
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974), expenditures for capital
equipment are not immediately deductible in determining taxable income; rather, the firm can deduct
in a given year only the amount by which the value of its capital assets has depreciated in that year.
Thus, a firm that devotes 100% of its net earnings in a given year to the purchase of new capital
equipment will still be liable for taxes so long as the amount spent on the new equipment exceeds the
total depreciation for that year on the firm's existing capital equipment.
23. Although there is debate on the matter, it has been claimed that the depreciation deductions
permitted under the federal corporate income tax are excessive (that is, in excess of actual decline in
value), at least for certain classes of capital expenditures, and particularly after the recent liberaliza-
tion of these deductions. See H.R. REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1981) (stating that one
purpose of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 is to establish depreciation allowances in excess of
actual decline in value, in order to stimulate investment). To the extent that this is the case, there is a
corresponding reduction in the effective rate of tax on net capital investment by firms subject to in-
come tax-and the importance of the exemption is decreased proportionately. At the extreme, there
would be a zero rate of tax on retained earnings devoted to capital investment if 100% of the cost of a
capital expenditure could be deducted in the year in which the expenditure was made. Under such a
regime, the rationale offered for the exemption in Section VI below would lose some of its force. See
note 78 infra.
24. See note 20 supra.
25. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, speak of nonprofits in terms of two broad categories: "public
service" organizations and "mutual benefit" organizations. The authors offer no definition for either
of these categories; rather, they simply provide representative lists of organizations that they feel typ-
ify the two categories. Thus, they state that the principal types of organizations in the public service
category are charitable organizations, educational institutions, scientific organizations, social welfare
organizations, churches and other religious organizations, and political parties, while they state that
"the most important" examples of mutual benefit nonprofits are social clubs, consumer cooperatives
and similar organizations, labor unions, and trade associations. Id. at 305-06. From these examples,
and from their discussion of the issues presented by these two categories, it seems clear that when
Bittker and Rahdert speak of "public service" nonprofits they are thinking of donative nonprofits, and
that when they speak of "mutual benefit" nonprofits they have in mind nonprofits that not only serve
primarily to provide services directly to the individuals who patronize them but are, further, organized
as membership organizations directly controlled by the patrons they serve (a class of organizations
that is elsewhere labeled "commercial mutual" nonprofits, see Section XI, pp. 43-96 infra).
The discussion offered by Bittker and Rahdert generally proceeds as if there were no other impor-
tant categories of nonprofits. Yet their categorization, and their discussion in general, omits the largest
and most troublesome class of nonprofits-namely ordinary commercial nonprofits (or, more precisely,
"commercial entrepreneurial" nonprofits-that is, commercial nonprofits that are not organized as
membership organizations, see p. 93 infra.) It is striking, for example, that nowhere in their long
article do Bittker and Rahdert discuss the exemption as it applies to nonprofit hospitals, though hospi-
tals alone seem to account for roughly half of the GNP generated by the nonprofit sector, see
Hansmann, supra note 2, at 835 n.1, and though, as noted in the text immediately following, the
application of the exemption to hospitals has recently been the focus of considerable controversy.
Bittker and Rahdert's division of nonprofits into "public service" and "mutual benefit" organiza-
tions parallels the categorization of nonprofits in the recently enacted California Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 5,000-10,846 (West Supp. 1981), which divides nonprofit corporations
into "nonprofit public benefit corporations" and "nonprofit mutual benefit corporations," and applies
different standards of conduct to the two types. The categorization established by the California act is
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been considerable controversy over the IRS's 1969 decision to alter its pol-
icy and explicitly extend the exemption not only to hospitals that are don-
ative, as has always been done, but also to hospitals that are operated
strictly as commercial nonprofits."6
Yet even for donative nonprofits there is a natural correlate to the con-
cept of taxable income developed for business entities. Consider, for exam-
ple, a donative organization like the American Red Cross. If an individual
makes a contribution to the Red Cross, it is presumably with the intention
that the money will be used to provide food, housing, and medical treat-
ment for disaster victims. In other words, the contributor is in effect buy-
ing disaster relief. And the Red Cross is, in a sense, in the business of
producing and selling that disaster relief.27 The transaction differs from an
ordinary sale of goods or services, in essence, only in that the individual
who purchases the goods and services involved is different from the indi-
viduals to whom they are delivered.
It follows that we can view the contributions received by the Red Cross
and other such donative organizations as sales receipts, and hence-if such
organizations were to be subjected to income taxation-as funds that are
appropriately includable in gross income. The cost of the services, such as
disaster relief, rendered by donative nonprofits would then be deductible,
analogously to ordinary business expenses. The result is that donative
nonprofits would be taxed annually on the amount, if any, by which their
total receipts, from contributions as well as from other sources (such as
investment income and amounts received from ordinary sales), exceed
their total expenditures on the services to which they are dedicated. As
with commercial nonprofits, the tax would therefore effectively be levied
on retained earnings.2 8
There need be nothing troubling about such a definition of income.
Suppose that you pay Tiffany to ship to a friend a wedding gift that you
select from Tiffany's catalogue. The structure of the transaction is much
the same as if you give to the Red Cross money to spend on food for a
discussed and criticized at length in Hansmann, supra note 12, at 535-37.
26. See note 16 supra. Nursing homes, also discussed supra note 16, provide another conspicuous
example. See also the cases discussed at p. 90 infra.
27. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 846-48, 872-73.
28. After exploring at length the absurdities of other, less natural definitions of taxable income for
donative nonprofits, Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, briefly note the possibility of adopting the
definition suggested here and summarily dismiss it, saying only that "[s]ince these accumulations and
capital outlays are irrevocably dedicated to the institution's nonprofit objectives. . . we do not regard
this alternative mode of computing a nonprofit organization's income as very appealing; nor can we
see that it has any economic or social advantages over a regime of complete exemption." Id. at 312.
Rather surprisingly, Bittker and Rahdert proceed to argue elsewhere in their article that business
leagues-which often take the form of donative nonprofits-should be taxed, and suggest that "[t]here
would be no great difficulty in applying familiar principles of income computation to their activities
... " Id. at 357.
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flood victim; in each case you are paying an organization to render ser-
vices to a third party. Yet few would argue seriously that the amount you
give Tiffany is not appropriately includable in Tiffany's income, or that
the cost of sending the gift should not be considered a deductible expense
for them.29
B. Will There Be Any Long-Run Tax Liability?
Thus, it seems that without much difficulty we can extend to nonprofits
the general principles of tax accounting commonly applied to profit-seek-
ing firms. But will such accounting actually lead to any tax revenue?30 An
argument against taxing the income of nonprofits that one sometimes
hears is that, in the long run, nonprofits will necessarily have no net prof-
its, since, by virtue of the nondistribution constraint, they must ultimately
spend all of their income on the purposes for which they were formed,
and hence their total expenses must ultimately equal their total income.
The strength of this argument depends on several factors, including the
detailed accounting conventions employed. In particular, in order for the
cumulative net long-run tax liability of a nonprofit to be zero, it must be
the case that (1) all expenditures made by the nonprofit, including distri-
butions upon dissolution, are considered deductible expenses, (2) losses in
any year can be carried back to cover gains in any previous year, (3) the
nonprofit has relatively free access to borrowed funds, and in particular
29. This brief discussion obviously leaves unresolved a number of accounting issues in the defini-
tion of taxable income for donative nonprofits. For example, consider the case of a nonprofit that
receives in a given year a large gift that is used for the acquisition of capital equipment. If the total
amount of the gift were to be included in the organization's gross income for the year of receipt, there
might be large apparent profits for that year, and hence a large tax liability. Yet this apparent profit
is of course somewhat illusory; it will be balanced in future years by the losses generated by the
depreciation of the capital equipment. This problem might be dealt with by making generous provi-
sion for income averaging of some form, such as by permitting losses to be carried back for more than
the three years currently provided for in I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A). Alternatively, the amount of such a
gift that is used for the acquisition of capital equipment could simply be excluded from gross income,
and the organization given a zero basis for the equipment thus purchased (so that no depreciation
could be taken in future years), as is currently done with nonshareholder contributions to capital for
business corporations under I.R.C. § 362(c).
These and other questions of detail in the definition of taxable income for donative nonprofits will
not be explored here in depth. The objective at this point is only to demonstrate that it is by no means
impossible to construct a definition of taxable income for nonprofits of all types that is consistent and
that proceeds along lines analogous to those employed in defining taxable income for business corpora-
tions. It will, in any case, be suggested below that there is a justification for continuing the current
policy of exempting nearly all donative nonprofits, and thus there is no need to go into detail concern-
ing the proper tax accounting for such organizations.
30. There appear to be no available estimates of the additional tax revenues that might be col-
lected from nonprofit organizations if the income tax exemption for nonprofits were eliminated. In
particular, such a figure has not been included in the "tax expenditure" budgets that have been
calculated by the federal government, see STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FED-
ERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1980-1985 (1980), perhaps because of confusion as to
(1) whether in fact the exemption amounts to a subsidy, and (2) the related issue of how a nonprofit's
tax liability would be computed in the absence of the exemption.
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can, without affecting its ability to borrow for other purposes, borrow
funds in any year at least equal to that year's tax liability plus interest
due on loans taken out in previous years to cover tax liabilities, and (4)
refunds from the Treasury of taxes that were overpaid in previous years
are accompanied by payment of interest by the Treasury at a rate equal to
the rate that the nonprofit must pay on funds that it borrows." These four
conditions, however, do not all hold. At present, losses can be carried back
only three years.32 Further, the Treasury does not pay interest when re-
funding overpayments from previous years. 33 And, perhaps most impor-
tantly, nonprofits do not have unrestricted access to borrowed capital-the
consequences of which are explored at length below. 4
C. Is the Corporate Tax Just a Tax on Capitalists?
At this point a further objection might be-and sometimes has
been 3'-raised. The corporate income tax as applied to business corpora-
tions can be viewed as, in effect, a tax on the returns to investors of equity
capital, and there is, by definition, no equity capital invested in nonprofit
31. To illustrate, consider a nonprofit that, in the absence of taxes, would be in existence for just
three years, and would have the following receipts and expenses. Year 1: the organization receives a
$100 donation, and spends it all on nondepreciating capital equipment. Year 2: the organization pro-
duces and sells services that bring in receipts that exceed operating expenses by $25, and uses this $25
to buy additional capital equipment. Year 3: the organization again earns $25 above operating ex-
penses, as in the previous year; sells its capital equipment at the end of the year for $125; dissolves;
and gives away its $150 in net assets (perhaps to another organization performing similar services).
Now suppose that this same organization were subject to corporate income taxation, using a defini-
tion of taxable income such as that suggested at pp. 59-61 supra, under which all income, including
donations as well as sales receipts, is included in calculating gross income. If the four conditions stated
in the text were satisfied, then the organization could behave just as it would in the absence of taxa-
tion, with the simple addition that in each of the first two years it would borrow the amount necessary
to cover its tax liability for that year plus any interest on previous borrowing, and in the third year it
would repay the loans plus current interest with the tax refund that it would receive by carrying its
third year loss back to cover the earlier year's profits.
For example, if the tax rate were 50%, and if the organization could borrow at 10% interest, in
Year 1 the organization would have a tax liability of $50 (based on the $100 gift), and would borrow
the amount needed to pay this. In Year 2, the firm would have a tax liablity of $10 (based on gross
income of S25 less $5 in interest payments), and borrow $15 to cover this amount plus the $5 interest
on the previous year's loan. In Year 3, the organization would have a loss, for tax purposes, of
$131.50 ($25 gross income-the sale of the capital equipment is a wash since the sale price equals the
basis-minus $6.50 in interest payments on the $65 in outstanding loans and minus $150 for the
terminating distribution). The organization would carry back $120 of this loss to cover the profits
reported in earlier years, and as a result would receive from the Treasury the $60 in previous tax
payments plus $11.50 in interest on those overpayments (at 10%), or a total of $71.50. The interest
payment from the Treasury would just be offset by the remaining $11.50 in losses for the current
year, and thus would generate no further tax liability. The firm would then use the $71.50 refund
from the Treasury to pay off the $65 principle plus $6.50 interest on its outstanding loans, thus
ending up with a clean slate with respect to both borrowing and taxes.
32. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A).
33. Id. § 6611(0(1).
34. See pp. 71-74 infra.
35. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, at 345.
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firms. Thus, it might be argued, the net earnings of nonprofits should not
be equated, for tax purposes, with the net earnings of business corpora-
tions, since only the latter ultimately accrue to the benefit of private inves-
tors. In other words, the tax "base" for the corporate income tax simply
does not extend to nonprofits.
This argument proves too much, however, for it suggests that all non-
profit corporations should be exempt, whereas exemption has in fact al-
ways been available only to certain categories of them,36 and so far even
the strongest supporters of the exemption have not suggested that it be
extended to all organizations that are legitimately formed as nonprofit cor-
porations.37 Besides, is it so clear that there is no investor of equity capital
in a nonprofit? Can we not view the nonprofit corporation itself as the
ultimate owner of its capital, and hence treat it as the taxpayer? After all,
the income tax even as applied to business corporations has commonly
been rationalized on the basis that the corporation itself has taxable ca-
pacity apart from its investors-that it is conceptually a separate taxable
entity. 8 Or might we not view the patrons of a nonprofit, or perhaps the
recipients of its services (if they differ from its patrons), as the beneficial
owners of its invested capital?
Obviously, simple analogies and metaphors-which are too often the
primary analytic tools of lawyers, including tax lawyers-will not yield a
satisfying answer as to whether or not we should tax the net earnings of
nonprofit organizations. Rather, we must examine and judge the actual
consequences of imposing such a tax. That is, we must consider what the
world would look like both with and without such a tax, and then decide
which world we like better. In undertaking such an analysis of economic
policy it is, as usual, convenient to divide the problem into two aspects:
distribution and efficiency. The following discussion considers these as-
pects in turn.
III. Distributional Considerations
It has been argued that an income tax levied on nonprofits would be
inappropriate because it would not be related to the "ability to pay" of
those on whom the burden of the tax would fall.3' For example, a tax on
a donative organization like the Salvation Army would, it is said, be borne
by the poor to whom that organization renders services, and such a tax
36. Moreover, we now tax the unrelated business income even of exempt nonprofits, see p. 55
supra-though Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, at 316-26, are consistent in suggesting a reversal of
this policy.
37. Including Bittker and Rahdert. See, e.g., note 28 supra.
38. See C. MCCLURE, supra note 10, at 28-38.
39. See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, at 314-16.
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would therefore be unacceptably regressive. There are, however, several
difficulties with such reasoning.
To begin with, the corporate income tax even as applied to business
corporations is seldom justified on the basis of the "ability to pay" of the
individuals who ultimately bear its burden. As already noted, supporters
of that tax frequently seem to view corporations as independent taxable
entities with taxpaying capacity of their own, quite apart from their
shareholders, workers, or consumers.40 Indeed, there remains considerable
uncertainty as to the actual incidence of the corporate tax.41 In any case,
since the structure of the corporate tax makes the business corporation a
tax shelter for high-bracket investors,42 there is no reason to believe that
the tax is particularly progressive.
Moreover, it is not obvious that the ultimate incidence of an income tax
levied on nonprofits would be especially regressive. Where donative non-
profits are involved, we should probably see the donors as sharing in the
burden along with the beneficiaries, 43 and the donors are likely to be, on
average, rather prosperous. Also, as already noted, donative nonprofits
often are not redistributive, like the Salvation Army, but rather provide
services that benefit primarily the (generally well-heeled) class of people
comprising the organization's donors. This is generally true, for example,
of art museums, performing arts groups, churches, and, to the extent that
they are donative at all, educational and health care institutions. For such
organizations the burden of taxation, whether it falls on the donors or the
beneficiaries, is unlikely to be unacceptably regressive. We should remem-
ber, too, that a large proportion of nonprofits are essentially commercial
rather than donative organizations (in the sense defined above), and that
the services of these organizations seem to be consumed disproportionately
by the relatively affluent. In general, when considering tax incidence or
any other aspect of policy affecting nonprofits, we should avoid the com-
mon tendency to think primarily in terms of traditional charities such as
the Salvation Army or the Red Cross. We should keep in mind, rather,
that the great bulk of the nonprofit sector is comprised of service institu-
40. See p. 64 supra.
41. See, e.g., Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215
(1962); Stiglitz, supra note 10.
42. See Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94
HARV. L. REV. 717, 723 (1981).
43. In keeping with the discussion in Section II, we might view the incidence of a tax on a
donative nonprofit such as the Salvation Army in much the same terms as we would a sales tax on a
wedding gift that you buy at Tiffany for a friend. Depending on the elasticity of your demand for
such a gift with respect to price, you may well end up spending a larger gross (i.e., after-tax) amount
on the gift with the tax than without it. Moreover, even if the gross amount that you spend remains
constant or declines upon imposition of the tax, your welfare will decline because the quality of the
gift that you can buy with a given dollar expenditure will decline (and we must keep in mind that the
donor, as well as the donee, presumably derives utility from the gift).
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tions such as private colleges and hospitals" and that these latter institu-
tions-which, altogether, probably serve the prosperous more than they do
the poor-would be the nonprofits most affected by any change of policy.
Finally, the exemption benefits only those nonprofits that have retained
earnings, and the extent of this benefit is directly proportional to the
amount of income accumulated. Yet most highly redistributive charities do
not retain earnings in substantial amount, but rather pass their (largely
donative) income directly through to their beneficiaries. Nonprofits that
retain a substantial portion of their income from year to year-in the
form of capital expenditures or endowment funds-are generally organi-
zations, such as private schools, colleges, and hospitals, that disproportion-
ately serve the well-to-do.
In short, it seems that distributional considerations-or "ability to
pay"-are not dispositive in judging the desirability of a tax on the net
income of nonprofits. Consequently, our pursuit of a rationale for the ex-
emption must continue. We therefore turn to considerations of economic
efficiency.
IV. Subsidization of Services
A rather common view of the exemption is that it is a means of subsi-
dizing particular services-such as health care, education, research, and
aid to the poor-that nonprofit organizations often provide. For example,
those who suggest that nonprofits should be granted the exemption be-
cause they provide services that otherwise would have to be provided by
the government presumably subscribe to such a view."' An obvious advan-
tage of this rationale is that it provides some justification for the existing
practice of extending the exemption, not to all nonprofit organizations, but
rather only to those that serve purposes specifically listed in the tax code.
If this is in fact the theory on which the exemption is based, then in
order to determine whether the exemption is good policy, one would want
to examine the reasons why each activity qualifying for the exemption"
would otherwise be undersupplied by the private market, and therefore
require a government subsidy. Such justification might be sought, for ex-
ample, in the existence of uncompensated benefits ("beneficial externali-
ties") that the activity brings to the society at large. Rather than under-
take such an inquiry here, however, we shall focus on two more general
and fundamental difficulties that confront such a subsidy theory: First,
why is the exemption extended only to nonprofit, and not also to for-
44. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 835 n.1.
45. E.g., Stone, supra note 5, at 45.
46. See note 13 supra.
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profit, providers of the services? And second, if the intention is to subsi-
dize the provision of services, does it make any sense to provide a subsidy
that is tied directly to the size of an organization's retained earnings?
A. Why Not Exempt For-Profit Firms Also?
The exemption for nonprofit firms does not make much sense as a sub-
sidy for provision of services unless we can understand why the exemption
is not granted as well to for-profit providers of the same services. If, for
example, private nonprofit hospitals and secondary schools are granted ex-
emption in order to subsidize the provision of hospital care and secondary
education, why are not for-profit hospitals and secondary schools also ex-
empted from income taxation?
There are, in fact, several possible arguments for confining subsidies for
certain services just to nonprofit providers. Standing on their own, how-
ever, none of these arguments is terribly compelling.
1. Subsidy Incidence
To begin with, the nondistribution constraint that characterizes non-
profits provides some assurance that a subsidy to a nonprofit will redound
to the benefit of the consumers of the organization's services in the form of
lower prices or higher quality. There might be concern that the benefit of
a tax exemption for a profit-seeking firm would simply go to the owners
of the business in the form of higher profits.
Yet in a reasonably competitive market consumers would receive most
or all of the benefit of a subsidy even to for-profit firms. Consequently,
confining the subsidy to nonprofits is necessary only if there is market
failure of some sort preventing effective competition among profit-seeking
firms. Even then, the precise incidence of the subsidy to for-profit firms as
between consumers on the one hand and owners on the other would de-
pend on the particular form that market failure takes. Even a profit-maxi-
mizing monopolist, for example, will have an incentive to pass on to con-
sumers some of the benefit of a cost subsidy.47
The services provided by nonprofit firms are, in fact, typically such that
market failure is to be expected among profit-seeking producers of those
services. The particular form of market failure involved, which will be
referred to here as "contract failure, ' 4 and which is described in more
detail below, 49 derives from the inability of some or most consumers to
47. When a monopolist's marginal cost of production is reduced (as it would be by a subsidy), his
profit-maximizing level of output increases, and the profit-maximizing price for his product decreases.
48. The term derives from Hansmann, supra note 2, at 845.
49. Pp. 69-70 infra.
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make accurate judgments concerning the quality, quantity, or price of ser-
vices provided by alternative producers. It is possible that the existence of
contract failure would provide an opportunity for profit-seeking producers
to divert to themselves some portion of the benefit of a tax subsidy.5" If so,
there may be some justification for confining tax subsidies to nonprofit
firms, at least for those services that are subject to contract failure. This is,
however, a rather attenuated argument.
2. Production of Public Goods
An alternative reason for confining tax subsidies just to the nonprofit
firms within given industries could be that the nonprofits tend to produce
a different product mix than do the for-profit firms. In particular, many
nonprofits serve an important role in producing public goods (in the econ-
omist's sense of that term)," which would be undersupplied without sub-
sidies. For example, it seems that nonprofit educational institutions are
more likely to produce research, and nonprofit day care centers are more
likely to provide free service for the poor, than are their proprietary
counterparts.
This is surely a plausible rationale for subsidizing nonprofit producers
of certain services, though it is doubtful whether this rationale can be ex-
tended to the entire class of nonprofits to which the exemption has been
granted. For example, as already noted, in recent years the exemption has
been explicitly interpreted to encompass virtually all nonprofit hospitals,
whether or not they provide free care for indigents or engage in other
activities that might be thought to involve benefits to society at large.12 A
similar policy also seems to have been adopted with respect to nursing
homes.5 3 And private educational institutions, including primary schools,
secondary schools, and colleges that have no graduate programs and pro-
duce insignificant amounts of research, have also long been routinely ex-
empted. 4 Since such essentially private-service institutions constitute a
large fraction, in dollar terms, of the entire nonprofit sector,5 they re-
present no small exception to the public goods theory of tax subsidization.
50. Precisely how much, if any, of a tax subsidy could be captured by the owners of for-profit
firms in such circumstances is, however, quite uncertain. At present we know rather little about the
dynamics of competition in markets populated by both nonprofit and for-profit firms. See Hansmann,
supra note 2, at 899-901.
51. See B. WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR (1977); Hansmann, supra note 2, at
848-54.
52. See note 16 supra.
53. See id.
54. See Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii) (example (1)).
55. See note 21 supra; Hansmann, supra note 2, at 835 n.l.
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3. Quality of Service
It has already been remarked that the services provided by nonprofits
are commonly characterized by a particular type of market failure termed
"contract failure." The problems of contract failure arguably provide the
basis for yet another rationale for giving selective subsidies to nonprofit
providers of many services. To understand this argument, and to under-
stand as well the alternative analysis of the exemption that will be offered
later in this Article, a closer description of contract failure-which has
been analyzed in far greater detail elsewhere" 6-is in order.
Contract failure arises when, owing to the nature of the service itself or
to the circumstances under which it is consumed, the purchasers of the
service-whether we style them donors or consumers-are likely to have
difficulty in (1) comparing the quality of performance offered by compet-
ing providers before a purchase is made, or (2) determining, after a
purchase is made, whether the service was actually performed as prom-
ised. As a result of such conditions, ordinary market competition may be
insufficient to police the performance of for-profit firms, thus leaving them
free to charge excessive prices for inferior service. In such circumstances
consumers often turn to nonprofit providers, which, owing to the nondis-
tribution constraint, have less opportunity and incentive to exploit con-
sumers than do for-profit firms, and thus serve as fiduciaries of a sort for
their consumers.
Consider, for example, a typical donative nonprofit such as the Red
Cross. As noted earlier, that organization is essentially in the business of
"selling" disaster relief services to its contributors, for delivery to third
parties. A for-profit firm might conceivably produce the same ser-
vices-offering, say, to provide some given amount of food, medical care,
or alternative housing to disaster relief victims-in return for payment of
a specified sum. The difficulty is that, because the services are to be pro-
vided to third parties with whom the purchaser has no contract, and be-
cause the services involved are often of an indivisible character that makes
it difficult to specify in advance precisely what the firm is to provide in
return for each individual purchaser's payment, individuals patronizing
such a for-profit version of the Red Cross would have considerable diffi-
culty in drawing up a meaningful contract specifying the services to be
performed, and in judging subsequently whether the firm had in fact per-
formed the services as promised. With a nonprofit producer, in contrast,
the patron has some assurance, by virtue of the nondistribution constraint,
56. Hansmann, supra note 2. See also Nelson & Krashinsky, Two Major Issues of Public Policy:
Public Subsidy and Organization of Supply, in PUBLIC POLICY FOR DAY CARE OF YOUNG CHILDREN
47 (D. Young & R. Nelson eds. 1973).
The Yale Law Journal
that all of the funds he turns over to the firm will in fact be used to
produce the services that the firm holds itself out as providing, and thus he
need not try to draw up and enforce a detailed contract with the firm.
Such problems of contract failure are most conspicuous in the case of
services provided by donative nonprofits, which commonly involve delivery
of the service to third parties, and in the provision of public goods with
their attendant problems of indivisibility. Contract failure is presumably
less of a problem with services provided by commercial nonprofits, which
are by definition private goods delivered directly to the individuals who
pay for them. Nonetheless, it appears that commercial nonprofits, too,
often have arisen in response to problems of contract failure. Complex
personal services such as day care and residential nursing care, for exam-
ple, may be quite difficult for some consumers to evaluate with confidence,
thus leading those consumers to seek out nonprofit providers as a form of
protection against exploitation.
In short, under circumstances of substantial contract failure, nonprofit
firms may serve consumers more efficiently 7 than for-profit firms. Per-
haps, then, tax exemption can be justified as a means of encouraging the
development of nonprofit firms in those industries in which, owing to the
existence of contract failure, they are likely to have this efficiency
advantage.
To be sure, it is not clear that this theory helps to justify the exemption
in such important fields as hospital care, where the contract failure theory
of nonprofits seems weakest." But this may simply be a problem of an
uncritical overextension of the exemption. A more fundamental problem
with such a theory, however, is that it is not obvious why a subsidy is
needed to encourage nonprofits even where their development seems ap-
propriate as a response to contract failure. Why can consumers not be
trusted to select nonprofit rather than proprietary producers on their own
in those situations in which nonprofits are to be expected to offer more
reliable service? And, if there are cases in which consumers cannot in fact
57. To be more precise, the potential advantages, in terms of economic efficiency, offered by non-
profit producers in situations of contract failure derive from such things as (1) a reduction in the
efforts that consumers feel impelled to make to police the provider of a service when the provider is
nonprofit rather than for-profit, (2) a reduction in the disparity between cost and price occasioned by
the elimination of the excessive profits that for-profit producers might be able to secure, and (3)
prevention of the type of degeneration that threatens "lemons"-type markets, see Akerlof, The Market
for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
There are, on the other hand, certain inefficiencies that also seem characteristic of the nonprofit
form. Most notable among these is the reduced effort to minimize costs that seems to accompany the
elimination of ownership rights in the organization. Nonprofit firms are to be preferred to for-profit
firms on efficiency grounds only when such inefficiencies are more than counter-balanced by efficiency
gains such as those described above. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 844-45, 877-79.
58. See Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry? 93 HARV. L. REV. 1416
(1980); Hansmann, supra note 2, at 866-68.
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be trusted to make such a decision wisely, is not a tax subsidy a remark-
ably indirect response to the problem? Should not proprietary producers
be outlawed entirely-or at least put under severe regulatory re-
straint-where they are obviously unsuitable but are likely to attract con-
sumers nonetheless ? 9
B. Does a Subsidy Tied to Net Income Make Sense?
Even if one were to conclude, on the basis of one or more of the three
theories just surveyed, that a subsidy confined to nonprofit providers of
certain services is appropriate, it does not necessarily follow that subsi-
dizing these services through the particular device of exemption from in-
come taxation makes much sense. If we adopt the natural definition of
taxable income suggested earlier,' the amount of the subsidy that results
from exemption will be directly proportional to retained earnings. But
there is no reason to expect a positive correlation between the amount of a
nonprofit's retained earnings and the factors just described that might jus-
tify a subsidy-such as the degree of contract failure that characterizes the
services that the nonprofit produces, or the extent to which the nonprofit
produces public as opposed to private goods.
In fact, there is some reason to connect the amount of subsidy that a
nonprofit receives to its retained earnings. But before advancing that argu-
ment, let us briefly consider another, rather different rationale for the ex-
emption-namely that it is required in order to avoid defeating the poli-
cies that lie behind the charitable deduction.
V. Consistency with the Charitable Deduction
If an individual makes a contribution to any of a large class of nonprof-
its-a class that constitutes a subset, though a substantial subset, of those
nonprofits that qualify for exemption from the federal income tax-that
contribution can be deducted from the individual's income when he calcu-
lates his personal federal income tax.61 This "charitable deduction" can be
justifed reasonably convincingly on efficiency grounds as a means of en-
couraging individuals to contribute to the production of certain services,
commonly provided by nonprofits, that are otherwise likely to be under-
produced-including, in particular, public goods.62 If, for this or for other
reasons, the charitable deduction is taken to be good policy, then it might
59. These issues are discussed at considerably greater length in Hansmann, supra note 12, at
519-27.
60. Pp. 59-61 supra.
61. I.R.C. § 170.
62. See p. 68 supra.
The Yale Law Journal
appear that the exemption can be justified on the ground that taxing the
income of the nonprofits that receive deductible contributions would be
taking away with one hand what has been given with the other.
This conclusion does not necessarily follow, however. In the first place,
the exemption has not been confined just to those organizations that qual-
ify for deductible contributions.63 More importantly, denial of exemption
would probably have little effect on many or most donative nonprofits.
Only those organizations that do not regularly spend their income (includ-
ing donations they receive) currently, but rather accumulate from year to
year, would face substantial income tax liabilities. Thus here, as in the
preceding discussion of the exemption as a subsidy in its own right, the
question comes down to determining whether it makes sense to give spe-
cial encouragement or discouragement to nonprofits that accumulate in-
come from one year to the next. As the following discussion suggests, there
may in fact be good reason to give such special attention to accumulation.
VI. Compensation for Capital Constraints
There is an efficiency rationale for the exemption that is more appeal-
ing than those discussed above, although it seems never to have been ex-
pressly offered before. That rationale is that the exemption serves to com-
pensate for difficulties that nonprofits have in raising capital, and that
such a capital subsidy can promote efficiency when employed in those in-
dustries in which nonprofit firms serve consumers better than their for-
profit counterparts.
Nonprofit organizations lack access to equity capital since, by virtue of
the nondistribution constraint, they cannot issue ownership shares that
give their holders a simultaneous right to participate in both net earnings
and control. Consequently, in raising capital, nonprofits are limited to
three sources: debt, donations, and retained earnings. These three sources
may, in many cases, prove inadequate to provide a nonprofit with all of
the capital that it needs.
Donations are commonly an uncertain source of capital for nonprofits,
and an inadequate one as well. Free-rider incentives"' presumably keep
the flow of contributions to donative nonprofits-many of which provide
public goods-well below the socially optimal level,65 and commercial
63. The class of organizations qualifying for the charitable deduction under I.R.C. § 170 is essen-
tially the same class that qualifies for the exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). The organizations
qualifying for the exemption under the other twenty-one subsections of I.R.C. § 501(c) do not, in
general, qualify for the deduction.
64. That is, incentives to refrain from contributing oneself, and simply enjoy without cost the
services provided by the donations of others.
65. The charitable deduction induces a substantially more generous flow of contributions to many
donative nonprofits than would otherwise be forthcoming. See Feldstein, The Income Tax and Chari-
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nonprofits, by definition, receive few gifts of any sort. Debt, too, has dis-
tinct limits as a source of capital for most nonprofits. Lenders are com-
monly unwilling to provide anything near 100% of the capital needs even
of proprietary firms, and are evidently even more conservative in lending
to nonprofit firms." One reason for this is that, as debt comes to account
for something close to 100% of a nonprofit's capital, it becomes increas-
ingly unlikely that the organization's assets will provide adequate security
for the debt. Of course, such a lack of security need not rule out debt
financing. Debt, like equity, can be used as an instrument for risky invest-
ments; one need simply run up the interest rate on loans and bonds as
they come to account for a larger fraction of the organization's capital.
However, the transaction costs of using debt instruments for capital
financing under conditions of substantial risk are high, and presumably
prohibitive beyond some point well short of 100% debt financing.67
As a consequence of these restrictions on external financing, a nonprofit
organization's ability to accumulate retained earnings is of substantial im-
portance as a means of capital expansion. The reason for this is twofold.
First, accumulated earnings can be used directly to finance capital im-
provements. Second, the amount of debt financing that a nonprofit can
table Contributions (pts. I & 2), 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 209 (1975). Even with this incentive, however,
the private return to a donation in support of a public good is probably still well below the effective
cost of the contribution to the donor.
Of course, some donative nonprofits, far from being underfunded, receive contributions in excess of
the amounts they can use constructively. See note 98 infra.
66. See P. Ginsburg, Capital in Non-Profit Hospitals 26-28, 180-84 (December 1970) (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation available in Harvard University Library).
67. If a nonprofit's debt is so large that nearly all of its expected income beyond non-capital
expenses must be devoted to interest payments, and if the organization's gross income in any given
period is uncertain, there is a high probability that in any given period the organization will be
unable to meet its interest obligations. When such a default occurs, the lender must decide whether to
foreclose or refinance. Foreclosure is a costly procedure, whether or not the organization's assets are
sufficient to cover the debt. Even if refinancing is regularly undertaken in the face of such defaults, the
loans must be rewritten and the terms of the refinancing negotiated, which could be extremely awk-
ward and costly. Indeed, the process would be so cumbersome that it would probably be impossible to
undertake on a regular basis if the debt instruments involved were bonds rather than bank loans. And
even with bank loans there would soon come a point, as the risk of technical default rose, at which the
expected transaction costs of continual refinancing would represent an unacceptable portion of the
expected return on the loans involved.
Note, too, the awkwardness of the control relationships involved with such high risk debt financing.
The lender will naturally have an ongoing interest in the conduct of the organization's affairs. Yet the
only way the lender can exercise some degree of control over the organization, in order to protect that
interest, is to negotiate with the organization's management under the threat of withholding further
credit or foreclosing in case of technical default. This is likely to be an unsatisfactory method of
governing the organization's affairs from the point of view of both the lender and the borrowing
organization.
Equity financing via joint stock investments has developed precisely to provide a flexible instrument
for capital investment in situations involving risk. To try to use debt instruments to create the same
flexibility, and to give the lender the control he needs to ensure that the borrower does not abuse that
flexibility, will commonly be so cumbersome that the costs outweigh the benefits. Indeed, if one were
to succeed in structuring debt investments in this way, they might well have so many of the properties
of ownership shares that the borrowing organization could no longer be deemed to be nonprofit.
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obtain is proportional to some extent to the amount of revenue it can de-
rive from retained earnings, since capital purchased with such earnings
provides an extra margin of security for the debt, and since the cash flow
from such earnings is evidence to lenders that interest payments on the
debt can be covered." To be sure, retained earnings, even when added to
the sources of external financing available to nonprofits, are likely to
prove an inadequate source of capital where the need for expansion is
strong. But at least such earnings have the advantage that they are likely
to be proportional to the degree to which demand for the organization's
services exceeds its ability to supply them, since excess demand will gener-
ally permit the organization to raise its prices (or attract larger
donations).
A case can therefore be made against an income tax on nonprofits on
the ground that such a tax would (at current corporate rates) cut retained
earnings roughly in half, and hence would further cripple a group of or-
ganizations that is already capital-constrained. Or, put differently, the ex-
emption can be understood as a subsidy to capital formation.
Of course, the mere fact that nonprofits as a class have difficulty raising
adequate amounts of capital does not in itself constitute a justification for
providing them with a capital subsidy. Quite the contrary: if the only
thing distinguishing nonprofit from for-profit providers of a given service
is that the nonprofits have difficulty raising adequate amounts of capital,
then a capital subsidy to the nonprofits would simply be wasteful; the
industry should be left to the for-profit firms. Indeed, presumably the rea-
son why most sectors of our economy are dominated by for-profit firms is
that they constitute, overall, the most efficient means of mobilizing pro-
ductive resources-including, in particular, capital.
The problem, however, is that often nonprofits are, aside from problems
of capital formation, more efficient than their for-profit counterparts in
providing those services characterized by contract failure. For such ser-
vices, the cost of the capital subsidy provided by corporate tax exemption
may be more than compensated for by the efficiency gains deriving from
the expansion of nonprofit producers that the subsidy encourages. 9
68. See Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 184.
69. There may be circumstances other than contract failure in which nonprofit firms have impor-
tant efficiency advantages over for-profit firms. Such circumstances have yet to be clearly identified,
however.
Some membership organizations, such as country clubs, seem to be formed on a nonprofit rather
than a for-profit basis not in response to contract failure, but rather as a means of avoiding simple
monopolistic exploitation. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 892-94. In these cases, however, the non-
profit form does not seem to be the only, or even the best, way of coping with the problems of
monopoly; rather, the cooperative form, which does not suffer from problems of capital formation to
quite the same degree as does the nonprofit form, seems adequate, and its broader use in such circum-
stances could easily be facilitated without any form of special tax treatment. See id.; Hansmann, supra
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Thus, the need for capital subsidies provides some justification for ex-
empting nonprofits from corporate income taxation in those industries in
which, owing to contract failure, nonprofits have important efficiency ad-
vantages over for-profit firms. And this, it appears, is the strongest argu-
ment that can be offered for the current policy of exempting many, but
not all, nonprofits from taxation.
This argument is not without difficulties. For one thing, as already
noted, it is not obvious that the exemption as currently administered is
confined to those industries characterized by contract failure. This objec-
tion could be met, however, by redefining the contours of the exemption as
suggested below.
More importantly, an exemption from income taxation is a crude mech-
anism for subsidizing capital formation in the nonprofit sector. The extent
to which nonprofit firms are capital constrained evidently varies consider-
ably from one industry to another, and, even within industries, from one
firm to another. Although direct evidence of the degree of under- or over-
investment among nonprofit firms is largely lacking, there is strong indi-
rect evidence suggesting that nonprofit firms in rapidly growing service
industries, such as nursing care, have had their growth noticeably ham-
pered by an inadequate supply of capital.70 At the same time, there is
good reason to believe that in many cases nonprofit firms are substantially
overcapitalized; this often seems to be the case today, for example, with
nonprofit hospitals." Simply granting or denying income tax exemption
will obviously fail to eliminate all such disparity in access to capital
among nonprofit firms, or between nonprofit and for-profit firms. The ex-
emption alone can only ameliorate, not eliminate, severe cases of capital
constraint, while, in turn, denial of the exemption will in itself be inade-
quate to insure that a nonprofit does not accumulate capital far in excess
of the efficient level of investment.
note 12, at 587-99. Moreover, whether organized as nonprofits, cooperatives, or whatever, member-
ship organizations such as country clubs are presumably well situated to raise adequate amounts of
capital through their members. See pp. 94-95 infra.
70. Studies of several service industries populated by both nonprofit and for-profit firms suggest
that the ratio of nonprofit to for-profit firms varies inversely with the rate of growth in demand. Thus,
the percentage of private nursing homes that are nonprofit has been shown to be (as of 1975) signifi-
cantly lower in those states that have experienced rapid increases in their elderly population. H.
Hansmann, The Importance of Property Tax Exemption as an Incentive for Organizing Services on a
Nonprofit Basis (unpublished, October 1981) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Similarly, the change
in the ratio of for-profit to nonprofit hospitals during the rapid expansion of the hospital industry in
the 1960s for different states showed a significant positive correlation with the rate of growth in state
population. Steinwald & Neuhauser, The Role of the Proprietary Hospital, 35 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 817, 828 (1970). Differences in access to capital seem to offer the most natural explanation for
the difference in growth rates between nonprofit and for-profit firms in these cases. See id. at 828. A
lack of strong incentives for managers and entrepreneurs in the nonprofit sector to pursue rapid
growth may also play a role here, however. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 878-79.
71. See notes 98 & 102 infra.
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VII. Dynamics of Nonprofit Growth
In order to get a better grasp of the strengths and weaknesses of the
capital formation rationale for the exemption, and to understand the con-
sequences of the exemption in general, it helps to focus on the dynamics of
competition in an industry potentially populated with both nonprofit and
for-profit firms. The following discussion considers, in general terms, the
form that this competition is likely to take, and the way in which tax
policy is likely to affect such competition. A simple mathematical model
that parallels this discussion is presented in the appendix, for purposes of
further illustration. Readers whose taste for detailed economic analysis is
limited, and who are not concerned with the fine points of the argument,
can safely skip this section and the following section, and proceed directly
to Section IX.
For simplicity, let us assume, initially, that the industry in question
produces a service that is sold on the market for a price that, following the
usual law of demand, is inversely related to the total amount of the service
produced and offered for sale by the industry, and that receipts from the
sale of this service are the only source of revenue for the producing firms,
whether for-profit or nonprofit. Thus, for the moment we shall focus only
on commercial nonprofits, and shall defer questions of donative financing.
Let us also assume, initially, that the nature and quality of the service do
not depend upon whether it is provided by a nonprofit or a for-profit firm.
A. For-Profit Firms Only
To begin with, suppose that the industry is populated only with for-
profit firms. Whether the industry is taxed or not, assuming that there are
no substantial economies of scale or other obstacles to effective competi-
tion, the forces of competition will tend to lead the industry to expand
quickly to the level of production at which all firms (or at least the
marginal firms) are just breaking even. This is because additional capital
can presumably be obtained readily through the equity market so long as
the industry has not yet reached the point at which firms are just breaking
even. At this level of production, the price that the service brings on the
market will have dropped to the point where each firm is earning just
enough from sale of the service to permit it to pay the prevailing market
rate of return for all inputs that it employs, including a competitive wage
for its workers and a competitive return on invested capital.
If, as is commonly supposed, the corporate income tax, when applied to
a for-profit firm, essentially serves as a tax on the return paid to investors
of capital, then the effect of imposing such a tax on the industry is to raise
the price at which the service must be sold in order for the firm to break
76
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even. It follows that the imposition of the corporate tax on this industry
will reduce somewhat the amount of the service that is produced and
sold.72
B. Nonprofit Firms Only
Now consider, alternatively, what is likely to happen if the service in
question is produced only by nonprofit firms.
Capital owned by a nonprofit firm-whether obtained through dona-
tions or through retained earnings-is essentially free to the firm, in the
sense that the firm need pay no return on that capital, and can turn it to
no uses other than production of the services for which the firm was or-
ganized. 7" The only capital expenses that a nonprofit must cover, there-
fore, are (1) interest on borrowed capital and (2) depreciation. To sim-
plify matters, assume for the moment that nonprofit firms do not have the
option of borrowing capital. Thus, the only expense facing the nonprofit
firms in our hypothetical industry, in connection with a given stock of
capital, is the depreciation on that capital.
It follows that a nonprofit firm will be able to break even, while main-
taining its current level of production, so long as its income from sale of
its services is sufficient to cover the expense of capital depreciation plus
wages and other variable costs. If demand for the service is high enough
relative to the total amount of the service that the existing firms in the
industry can produce, those firms will be able to charge more than enough
to cover such expenses, and thus will be able to accumulate net earnings
with which -to purchase additional capital that can be used to expand pro-
duction in the future. Indeed, since a nonprofit cannot distribute its net
earnings, it has little alternative but to spend its net earnings on additions
to its capital stock, and, conversely, firms can add to their capital stock
only to the extent that they are able to accumulate such net earnings
(again, ignoring for the moment the possibility of using debt).
In the absence of taxes, firms in the industry can therefore be expected
to expand until total production of the service has reached the point where
price has dropped to a level at which each firm has just enough income to
cover the costs of depreciation on capital plus noncapital costs such as
72. The effects of the corporate income tax, viewing it as an excise on corporate capital, are
explored in Harberger, supra note 41.
It has recently been suggested that the corporate tax may not, in fact, act as an excise on corporate
capital, but rather as a pure profits tax. The implications of this alternative view are explored in
Section VIII.E, p. 85 infra.
73. We shall ignore here, and throughout, the possibility that a nonprofit might choose to, and be
permitted to, invest in unrelated businesses. Allowing for such investment behavior would complicate
the analysis considerably without adding importantly to the basic points being made in this Article.
See Section X, pp. 92-93 infra.
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wages-that is, to the level at which the firms have no net earnings to
devote to additions to capital.14 As long as aggregate demand for the ser-
vice does not change, this is then the point at which the industry will
maintain itself.
The total amount of the service that is produced at this point will, it
should be noted, depend somewhat on the preferences of the managers of
the nonprofit firms. The reason for this is that the firms will generally be
confronted with a tradeoff between present and future production. A non-
profit firm with a given amount of capital can, on the one hand, use the
amounts of labor and other variable factors that maximize net earnings,
and thus maximize the amount of capital that can be purchased for the
purpose of expanding future production. Or, on the other hand, the firm
can simply increase the amount of labor and other variable factors that it
uses in the current period to the point where the expenses associated with
these factors are so large as to consume all potential profits, and thus
maximize current production of the service, while providing no opportu-
nity for expansion in the future. Put differently, the "price" that a non-
profit firm pays for the capital it uses for expansion is not the market rate
of return, but rather the amount of current production that must be fore-
gone in order to accumulate net earnings."
The point at which the nonprofit firms in the industry stop expanding,
therefore, will depend on the extent to which the managers of the firms
are prepared to trade off present for future production. A strong relative
preference for current production will lead the firms to stop growing at a
relatively low level of total industry production (and a high price for the
service, which is necessary to cover the high cost of producing with the
inefficiently low capital-labor ratio that will characterize such firms),
while a strong preference for future production will lead the firms to grow
more quickly, and to stop growing only when total industry production is
so large, and market price has fallen so low, that a very large amount of
present production would have to be foregone in order to obtain the prof-
its necessary to purchase the capital required for even a small amount of
74. There is another option open to nonprofit firms facing a high market price: they can sell their
service, not at the market price, but rather at a lower price that is at or below the level that just covers
variable costs plus depreciation, and hence accumulate no earnings with which to acquire additional
capital for purposes of expansion. (Indeed, if the price thus chosen is below that which is required to
cover depreciation on the existing capital, the firms will actually shrink over time.) Since, at such a
price, there will be excess demand for the service, firms electing this approach will need to ration their
services. This alternative will not be explored here, in part because, in a sense, it does not really add
anything new to the problem. We can simply view the service provided by nonprofits that behave this
way not as, say, nursing care, but rather as nursing care plus a subsidy of x dollars, the cost of which
is x dollars more than the cost of providing nursing care alone; the analysis offered in the text then
applies without modification.
75. This tradeoff does not appear in the model presented in the Appendix, since that model as-
sumes a fixed capital/labor ratio.
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future expansion."'
Now suppose that a tax is levied on the net income of the nonprofit
firms (using the definition of net income offered in Section ILA)." What
effect will such a tax have on production in our all-nonprofit industry?
Note, to begin with, that there will be no tax liability for a nonprofit firm
that is not growing, but rather is spending all of its income to cover the
costs of capital depreciation and variable costs such as wages. Thus, when
the industry has finally reached its equilibrium level of development, in
which all firms in the industry are just breaking even, there will be no tax
revenues forthcoming from the industry. In contrast, for-profit firms must
pay taxes even when they have reached the equilibrium point at which
they no longer have an incentive to expand. Thus, income taxes are not a
cost to nonprofit firms in equilibrium, and hence have no direct effects on
the level of production that the nonprofit firms will ultimately reach, in
contrast to the case with for-profit firms. In this respect an income tax
levied on a nonprofit differs from a property tax or a sales tax, both of
which yield positive tax liabilities for the firm even when the firm is not
growing and is just bringing in enough total revenue to cover its costs of
production (including taxes).
On the other hand, subjecting nonprofit firms to income taxation will
have an indirect effect on the behavior of the firms. Since such a tax is
effectively a tax on retained earnings, it will reduce the rate at which a
nonprofit firm can expand. For example, at a rate of fifty percent, an
income tax would tax away half of a nonprofit's retained earnings, and
consequently reduce by half the amount of capital that a nonprofit could
purchase with a given amount of retained earnings. Thus, an all-nonprofit
industry would expand toward its equilibrium level of production more
slowly than it would without the tax. Moreover, the tax has the effect of
worsening the tradeoff between present and future production that con-
fronts a nonprofit firm. With a fifty percent tax rate, twice as much pre-
sent production must be sacrificed for a given increase in future produc-
tion as would be the case without the tax. The result is that the managers
of nonprofit firms will find it less attractive to trade off present for future
production at any given level of production, and will put a stop to their
firm's expansion at a lower level of total industry production than they
would otherwise. Thus, the tax can be expected to reduce not only the
76. Owners and managers of for-profit firms, in contrast, are faced with the tradeoff of present for
future profits, and since, unlike nonprofits, they have relatively free access to the capital markets, they
have an incentive to press investment within the firm just to the point at which that tradeoff-which
is the internal rate of return on the firm's investments-equals the rate of return (interest rate) on
capital in the market. Thus, the capital market constrains the choice of present versus future produc-
tion in a for-profit firm more strongly than it does in a nonprofit firm.
77. See pp. 58-62 infra.
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rate at which nonprofit firms grow toward their equilibrium level of pro-
duction, but also the aggregate amount of the service that is produced at
equilibrium."8
C. Both Nonprofit and For-Profit Firms
Consider, finally, an industry in which, to begin with, there are only
for-profit firms, operating, as a consequence of competition, at the
breakeven (equilibrium) point as described above. Suppose, then, that one
or more nonprofit firms enter the industry, each with some initial supply
of capital. And let us assume, for the time being, that these nonprofit
firms can produce the service in question just as efficiently as the for-
profit firms in the industry-that is, they can produce a unit of the service
with the same amounts of inputs (capital, labor, etc.) as their for-profit
counterparts. Finally, let us assume also, for the moment, that there are
no income taxes for either for-profit or nonprofit firms.
At the prevailing market price at which the for-profit firms are just
breaking even, the nonprofit firms will be able to produce net earnings,
since, unlike the for-profit firms, they need pay no return on the capital
that they are employing. What the nonprofit firms proceed to do at this
point will depend on the preferences of the firms' managers.
If, on the one hand, the managers of the nonprofit firms have a reason-
ably strong preference for future expansion over present production, the
nonprofit firms will proceed to accumulate net earnings and to grow. The
resulting increase in total industry production will tend to drive down the
market price for the service, which in turn will cause for-profit firms to
start losing money and to begin leaving the industry. By this process the
nonprofit firms will continue to supplant for-profit firms until there are
only nonprofit firms producing the service. The nonprofit firms will con-
tinue to have net earnings, and to expand, however, even beyond the point
at which all for-profit firms have been driven from the industry. Such
expansion will stop only when the nonprofit firms have increased total
industry production to an all-nonprofit equilibrium, as described above,
with greater total production and lower market price than that which pre-
vailed before the nonprofit firms took over the industry.
If, on the other hand, the managers of the nonprofit firms have a strong
78. These effects will be diminished if depreciation allowances exceed actual decline in value for
capital investments. See note 23 supra. Even if 100% of the cost of a capital asset could be deducted in
the year of its purchase, however, the consequences of taxing nonprofits described here would continue
to some extent if nonprofit firms found it necessary-as presumably they often still would-to accu-
mulate cash reserves over several years in order to finance substantial capital expenditures, for those
cash accumulations would still be taxable, and the offsetting deduction for the purchase of the asset
could not be taken until the asset was actually purchased. (On such matters of timing, see note 31
supra.)
80
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preference for producing as much of the service as possible in the present,
without much concern for foregone opportunities for future growth, then
they may burn up all of their potential profits by hiring more labor and
other variable factors with which to expand current production. The non-
profits will not grow at all, but rather will simply coexist with the for-
profit firms at the market price and total level of industry production that
would prevail if there were only for-profit firms in the industry. Indeed, if
the managers of the for-profit firms were to push their preference for pre-
sent as opposed to future production to extremes, they might even fail to
accumulate sufficient funds to cover depreciation on their existing capital
stock, and hence the nonprofit firms would actually decline and would
eventually disappear entirely, leaving the industry to the for-profit firms
alone.
If the for-profit firms in the industry are subject to income taxation,
then it will be more likely that the nonprofit firms will ultimately take
over the industry. The reason for this is simply that, as we have seen,
imposing a tax on the for-profit firms increases the price at which they
must sell their services, and at this higher price the nonprofit firms will
face large potential profits and, thus, more favorable opportunities for
expansion.
If an income tax is then extended to the nonprofit firms in the industry,
it will reduce the likelihood that the nonprofits will ultimately drive out
the for-profit firms. As indicated by our earlier analysis, however, the con-
sequences of the tax in this respect will be only indirect. When the firms
in the industry, both nonprofit and for-profit, have stopped growing-and
hence the industry is in a state of equilibrium-the nonprofit firms will be
paying no income taxes, whether they have succeeded in taking over the
whole industry or are simply coexisting with the for-profit firms. Because
the tax does, however, make the tradeoff between present and future pro-
duction for the nonprofit firms less attractive than in the absence of the
tax, it will reduce the incentive for the nonprofit firms to expand produc-
tion at any given prevailing market price, and hence will reduce the likeli-
hood that the industry will be taken over by the nonprofits. Moreover, the
tax will slow the rate at which the nonprofits grow, and hence will extend
the time it takes for the nonprofit firms to attain their equilibrium level of
development, including takeover of the industry, if that is the equilibrium
result.
We see, then, that exemption of nonprofit firms from corporate income
taxation is not really a subsidy in the usual sense. In equilibrium, non-
profit firms will pay no income taxes whether they are included in the tax
base or not. In this respect, as already noted, exemption from the corpo-
rate income tax does not give nonprofit firms an advantage over their for-
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profit counterparts that is of the same character as that which results
when nonprofit firms are exempted from a property tax or a sales tax to
which for-profit firms are subjected. On the other hand, exemption from
income taxation does permit nonprofit firms to grow faster than they
could if they were taxed, and it does give them an incentive to grow, and
ultimately perhaps to take markets away from for-profit firms, in a
broader range of conditions than would be the case without the
exemption.79
VIII. Relaxing the Assumptions
Let us now relax some of the assumptions on which the discussion so
far has been premised, in order to understand the consequences of tax
exemption in a broader and more realistic range of circumstances.
A. Growing Demand
We have been assuming so far that demand in the industry is static. If,
however, demand for the service is steadily increasing, then the rate at
which nonprofits are able to take over an industry initially populated by
for-profit firms will be reduced. In fact, if demand for the service increases
faster than the rate at which the nonprofits are able to grow, then the
nonprofits will not be able to take over the industry at all, and there will
continue to be a mix of for-profit and nonprofit firms in the industry so
long as demand continues to expand at such a rate. Likewise, if an indus-
try is initially populated only with nonprofit firms, and then the demand
for the industry's service begins to grow rapidly, for-profit firms may be
able to enter the industry alongside the nonprofit firms, since only the for-
profit firms will face no constraint on the amount of capital they can ob-
tain, at market rates of return, for purposes of expansion. The varying
percentages over time of nonprofit and for-profit firms in the hospital in-
dustry, for example, seem to be explainable at least in part by such varia-
tions in the rate of growth in demand.80
It follows that tax exemption for nonprofits is likely to have its most
pronounced effects in an industry in which demand is expanding. The
79. This discussion, it should be noted, ignores questions of risk. The corporate income tax, if
extended to nonprofits, might have the effect of making the government a partner in bearing the risks
of the enterprise, and consequently could lead nonprofits to undertake more risky ventures than they
otherwise would. See Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation on Risk-
Taking, 83 Q.J. ECON. 263 (1969). If, in the absence of the tax, nonprofits tend to be excessively risk
averse, which may in fact be the case owing to the inability of nonprofits to employ equity financing,
then imposition of the corporate tax on nonprofits could lead to an improvement in efficiency as far as
risk-taking is concerned. Any welfare effects of this sort, however, seem likely to be swamped by the
effects that are the focus of the discussion in the text.
80. See Steinwald & Neuhauser, supra note 70, at 828.
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exemption will have a strong influence on the length of time required for
nonprofits to catch up with demand growth, and, hence, on the balance
between nonprofit and for-profit producers at any given moment.
B. Relative Efficiency of Nonprofit Firms
We have also been assuming that both nonprofit and for-profit firms
can produce the service in question with the same efficiency. Typically,
however, the differences in the form of organization will result in some
disparity in efficiency.
In most industries nonprofit firms are probably less efficient than their
for-profit counterparts, owing to the decreased incentives for cost minimi-
zation that result from the absence of the profit motive,81 and to the ab-
sence of special circumstances-in particular, contract failure-that give
nonprofits a countervailing efficiency advantage. 82 If this disparity in effi-
ciency is so large that, at the breakeven price for for-profit firms, non-
profit firms cannot even cover their non-capital costs, then nonprofit firms
will not be able to survive in competition with for-profit firms. At more
modest levels of inefficiency, however, nonprofits may be able not only to
survive in competition with for-profit firms, but also to grow and perhaps
even eventually take over the industry, since nonprofits are spared the
necessity of paying a competitive rate of return on the capital they em-
ploy, and this may compensate for their inefficiency. Whether or not the
for-profit firms are subject to income taxation will have an effect here:
The higher the rate of tax levied on the for-profit firms, the less efficient
the nonprofit firms need be in order to compete with them effectively.
The ability of relatively inefficient nonprofits to survive in competition
with for-profit firms will not, however, depend directly on whether or not
the nonprofits are subject to income taxation. Rather, as we have seen,
nonprofit firms will pay no income taxes in equilibrium, and hence the
exemption will not affect their ability to cover their costs at any given
price level for the service that they sell. The exemption will only affect the
rate at which nonprofits can grow, and the incentive to grow that faces the
firms' managers.
Alternatively, it may be that owing to problems of contract failure, in
81. Although the separation of ownership and control in large business corporations may create
some opportunity for managerial inefficiency, the market for corporate control presumably places
some bounds on the extent to which such inefficiency can go. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). The management of a nonprofit corporation, in
contrast, is commonly self-appointing both in law and in fact, and thus is not only beyond the reach of
the market for corporate control, but is in fact directly responsible to nobody who has a direct interest
in the efficiency with which the organization is managed. See generally Hansmann, supra note 2, at
878.
82. See note 57 supra.
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producing the service in question, nonprofit firms are more efficient than
their for-profit counterparts. 3 In this case the nonprofit firms in the in-
dustry will clearly be able to survive and grow at the price that represents
the breakeven point for the for-profit firms.8 4 Only if the managers of the
nonprofit firms show a strong preference for present production over fu-
ture expansion, or if demand for the service is growing faster than the
nonprofit firms can accumulate earnings, will nonprofit firms fail ulti-
mately to supplant all the for-profit firms in the industry. This will be
true, moreover, whether or not the for-profit or the nonprofit firms in the
industry are subject to income taxation, though if the for-profit firms are
taxed, and if the nonprofit firms are exempt, nonprofit firms will be able
to expand at a greater rate, and will have more incentive to expand, than
they would otherwise.
C. Availability of Debt
The preceding discussion has been based on the assumption that non-
profit firms do not have access to debt, but rather must obtain all of their
new capital through retained earnings. This is, of course, unrealistic. Nev-
ertheless, the availability of debt capital only partially alters the basic con-
clusions reached above.
If debt capital were available to nonprofit firms without restriction,
then nonprofits would be able to expand rapidly to the point where price
for the service has fallen to the level at which it just covers variable costs
plus the interest cost of debt capital-which would be roughly the efficient
level of operation. Thus, the availability of tax exemption would not affect
the speed with which nonprofits could expand to the efficient level of pro-
duction. Nonprofit firms would, however, still be able to expand beyond
this point, using internally generated capital, and such expansion would
be governed by the same considerations discussed above.
Of course, it is equally unrealistic to think that nonprofits have unlim-
ited access to debt capital. Rather, nonprofits are, as noted earlier,85 likely
to be able to secure debt financing for a part, but by no means all, of their
capital needs. In general, then, we can say that, to the extent that non-
profits have access to debt capital, the importance of tax exemption in
83. See note 69 supra.
84. Or, what is effectively the same thing, the nonprofit firms will be able to charge a higher price
than will for-profit firms for the same quality of service, since consumers will feel less impelled to
undertake costly measures to verify for themselves the quality of the firm's services when the firm is
nonprofit than when it is for-profit (or, put differently, will "trust" the nonprofit providers more than
the for-profit providers). See note 57 supra.
85. See p. 73 supra.
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facilitating the expansion of nonprofits to their efficient level of production
will be reduced.
D. Donative Nonprofits
For purposes of simplicity and clarity, we have considered here only
strictly commercial nonprofits. All that has been said, however, applies
with equal force to donative nonprofits. We need simply view the dona-
tions that the firms receive as the price that the public is prepared to pay
for the services that the firms produce.
E. Alternative Views of the Corporation Tax
The preceding discussion has assumed that the corporate income tax, as
applied to business corporations, has the effect of raising the pre-tax rate
of return that a corporation must seek on its investments. It has recently
been suggested, however, that the corporate tax may in fact act as a tax
only on pure profits,86 having no effect on a firm's investment policy."
The general conclusions drawn here continue to apply under this alter-
native view of the corporate tax. The effects of extending the tax to non-
profits remain as described above. It will no longer be the case, however,
that the ability of nonprofits to survive in competition with for-profit firms
will be enhanced by the application of the tax to the for-profit firms, since
the tax will have no effect on the behavior of the latter firms.
IX. Implications for Tax Policy
We are now in a position to formulate the appropriate goals for tax
policy, and to consider whether exempting some or all nonprofits from
corporate income taxation will bring us closer to those goals.
A. Policy Objectives
From the perspective of economic efficiency, it is desirable to have non-
profit rather than for-profit firms in an industry if and only if the non-
profit firms are more efficient than for-profit firms in producing the ser-
vice in question. Since the primary efficiency advantage that nonprofit
firms have over for-profit firms appears to be in responding to contract
failure, this means that, in general, it is desirable to have nonprofit firms
develop where contract failure is a serious problem (and one that cannot
86. "Pure profits" are earnings in excess of what is necessary to pay for all factors of production,
including labor, capital, and entrepreneurial talent.
87. See Stiglitz, supra note 10.
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be dealt with by other means88), and not elsewhere.
Assuming that circumstances are such that nonprofit firms are the most
efficient producers of the service, the service should generally be produced
in that quantity at which the price that it brings just covers the marginal
costs of production, such as the costs of the capital, labor, and other fac-
tors used in producing the service. Capital, in particular, should be em-
ployed in the industry just up to the point at which its marginal produc-
tivity equals the costs of diverting the capital from other industries. If
there were no tax imposed on the returns to capital in other industries,
this would mean simply that capital should be used in an industry popu-
lated with nonprofits just to the point where its marginal productivity
equals the rate of return that capital is bringing in for-profit industries.
With a tax on the return to capital in other industries-in the form of the
corporate income tax and the personal income tax-the appropriate stan-
dard becomes more ambiguous. A rough approximation is that capital in
the nonprofit industry should be used up to the point at which its produc-
tivity equals the before-tax rate of return being earned on capital in other
industries.89
B. Choosing an Appropriate Policy
It follows that, if tax exemption for nonprofits is to be administered in
accordance with the dictates of economic efficiency, two conditions should
be satisfied before exemption is granted to the nonprofit firms in a given
industry: (1) nonprofit firms must be more efficient producers of the ser-
vice than are for-profit firms; and (2) the nonprofit firms in the industry
must not have expanded to the point at which the productivity of the capi-
tal they employ has fallen below the before-tax rate of return being
earned on capital in other industries.
As a practical matter, it usually will not be feasible to condition tax
exemption for nonprofits on a judgment by the Treasury Department as
to whether capital investment among nonprofit firms in particular indus-
tries has exceeded the efficient level. Such a criterion would be extremely
difficult to administer. Consequently, the best that can be done in this
88. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 868-72.
89. The ambiguity results from problems of second best deriving from the fact that the corporate
tax distorts capital investment in for-profit firms, causing those firms to invest inefficiently small
amounts of capital. Of course, if we accept the alternative view of the corporate tax (as applied to for-
profit firms) as a tax only on pure profits, see p. 85 supra, then there is no difference between the
before-tax and the after-tax marginal rates of return among for-profit firms, and this problem
disappears.
90. It would be very hard to determine with any precision the effective marginal rate of return to
investment among nonprofit firms in any given industry; a rough estimate is probably all that could be
obtained. Administrative decisions based on rough empirical estimates, however, would always be
subject to attack. Moreover, policymaking would be complicated by the fact that the rate of return to
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area is probably to focus primarily on the first of the two criteria offered
here,91 and require as a condition of exemption simply that there be con-
vincing evidence that, in the industry in question, nonprofit firms are, ow-
ing to contract failure," more efficient than their for-profit counterparts.9 3
Of course, this is not the way that tax policy in this area is, or ever has
been, explicitly formulated. Nevertheless, the results achieved with current
policy represent at least a crude approximation to those that would be
reached following this approach. Thus, the exemption is frequently de-
nied, as it should be, to commercial nonprofits that produce, distribute, or
retail standard agricultural and industrial goods, and to those that offer
simple services.94 In such industries it seems extremely unlikely that non-
profit firms are more efficient than for-profit firms, and hence any level of
nonprofit development would be inefficient. There would obviously be lit-
tle point, for example, in granting the exemption to a nonprofit hardware
store.
On the other hand, the exemption is quite solidly entrenched for most
types of donative nonprofits.95 This, too, is consistent with the efficiency
criterion just suggested. Donative nonprofits, almost by definition, typi-
cally provide services that are delivered to third parties or are public
goods, and that as a consequence are attended by severe contract failure.9 6
capital for nonprofit firms in an industry will often vary from region to region and even firm to firm.
91. This is not to say, however, that the second criterion need be ignored entirely. See, e.g., note
98 infra.
92. If nonprofit firms could be demonstrated to have important efficiency advantages over for-
profit firms under identifiable conditions other than contract failure, similar reasoning could justify
granting tax exemption to nonprofit firms in those circumstances as well. See note 69 supra.
93. Of course, focusing just on the first of the two criteria suggested here would yield an unsatis-
factory result unless in fact the majority of firms that meet the first criterion meet the second criterion
as well. There is reason to believe, however, that this is the case. As discussed below, there seem to be
two broad classes of nonprofits that arguably meet the first criterion: donative nonprofits, and com-
mercial nonprofits that provide complex personal services. As discussed in note 98 infra, donative
nonprofits as a class seem more likely than not to suffer from inadequate access to capital. And
demand for the services of the second class of nonprofits-which include, for example, nursing homes,
day care centers, and family counseling clinics-has been growing sufficiently rapidly in recent de-
cades, see, e.g., note 16 supra (nursing homes), that it seems unlikely that the nonprofit firms in the
industries involved are, in general, overcapitalized.
94. See Federation Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980) (exemp-
tion denied to nonprofit pharmacy); Senior Citizens Stores, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 711 (5th
Cir. 1979) (exemption denied to nonprofit store selling used clothing, furniture, and household appli-
ances); People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923 (2nd Cir. 1964), cert. denied
379 U.S. 839 (1964) (exemption denied to nonprofit summer resort); B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978) (exemption denied to nonprofit consulting firm). But see Metropolitan
Detroit Area Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (exemption
granted to nonprofit corporation selling laundry services to governmental and nonprofit hospitals).
95. Because, as noted immediately below, donative nonprofits typically provide services that either
have desirable redistributive effects or are public goods, it is relatively easy to justify exemption for
such organizations on the basis that their services can be classified, for example, as "charitable,"
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), "civic," or "social welfare," I.R.C. § 501(c)(4). See Hansmann, supra note 2, at
514.
96. See pp. 69-70 supra.
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Indeed, the wisest course is probably just to assume, absent evidence to the
contrary, that all nonprofits that receive a substantial fraction97 of their
income in the form of donations are operating in an environment of con-
tract failure, and therefore merit the exemption on efficiency grounds.
Such a policy-which is essentially what we have now-may well grant
the exemption to some organizations for which it is unjustified. But a
more refined approach to donative nonprofits would probably not be
worth the increase in ambiguity and administrative complexity it would
entail.98
Between these two extremes-donative nonprofits on the one hand, and
commercial nonprofits that provide simple standardized services on the
other-we have the troublesome category of commercial nonprofits that
provide complex personal services such as education, hospital care, nurs-
ing care, and day care. For which, if any, of these services are the fiduci-
ary qualities of the nonprofit form so effective and necessary that tax ex-
emption can be justified on efficiency grounds? It is difficult to offer an
authoritative answer to this question, since at present there exist little
solid data concerning the relative performance of nonprofit and for-profit
firms in providing such services.
For most of these services-including, in particular, nursing care, day
care, and education (including vocational education)-continuation of the
current policy favoring exemption seems justifiable, though perhaps not
compelling. There is, to be sure, debate as to whether in fact the commer-
cial nonprofit firms in these industries, on average, serve consumers better
in any important respect than do their for-profit counterparts." Yet in
97. Just because an organization receives an occasional small donation, though it relies upon sales
receipts for the great bulk of its income, does not mean that it should be considered "donative" for
purposes of the analysis offered here. The mere presence of donative income should be considered
presumptive evidence of contract failure only when the organization involved is heavily dependent
upon such income.
98. Fortunately, the two criteria suggested above for granting the exemption-relative efficiency
vis-a-vis for-profits, and existing extent of capital accumulation-often go hand in hand. Not only is it
easier to make the case that nonprofit firms are more efficient than their for-profit counterparts would
be when the nonprofits in question are donative than when they are commercial, but further, it seems
in general less likely that donative nonprofits will exceed the efficient level of capital accumulation
than that commercial nonprofits will do so. The reason for this is that the services of donative non-
profits commonly have-at least to some degree, and at least for a limited group of individuals-the
characteristics of a public good, and consequently free-rider incentives are likely to keep the level of
donations, and hence the level of capital accumulation and of production, below the efficient level in
donative nonprofits. On the other hand, it is not always the case that donative nonprofits are inef-
ficiently constrained by lack of capital. Boys' Town, for example, evidently managed to accumulate,
through solicitation of donations, an amount of capital far in excess of any reasonable needs. See N.Y.
Times, April 16, 1974, at 41, col. 1.
99. For example, while some have argued that the widespread abuses that evidently characterize
the nursing home industry are primarily attributable to the for-profit firms in that industry, see Re-
gan, Quality Assurance Systems in Nursing Homes, 53 J. URB. L. 153, 210-14 (1975); Shulman &
Galanter, Reorganizing the Nursing Home Industry: A Proposal, 54 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q.
129 (1976), others have argued that, overall, there is not much to choose between nonprofit and for-
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each of these areas nonprofit firms represent a significant fraction of the
industry, and this has evidently occurred, in large part, because a substan-
tial subset of consumers feels more comfortable patronizing a nonprofit.
Until we have better data suggesting that these consumers are mistaken,
there is something to be said for continuing the exemption and thus help-
ing to insure that such consumers continue to have the option of patroniz-
ing a nonprofit.
On the other hand, it is not at all clear that there is justification for the
relatively recent decision to exempt nonprofit hospitals from taxation even
if they provide no research, teaching, or subsidized care for indigents; that
is, even if they are operated as strictly commercial.nonprofits.'00 Problems
of contract failure do not seem important in the case of most hospital ser-
vices. The continued predominance of the nonprofit form in this industry
seems, instead, to be attributable to historical and financial factors largely
unrelated to the relative efficiency of for-profit and nonprofit institu-
tions."' Moreover, there is evidence that, in general, the hospital industry
is already overcapitalized. 10 2 Thus, the hospital industry arguably fails
both the criteria suggested above for administering the exemption. The
current policy of exempting virtually all nonprofit hospitals may simply
further encourage what already appears to be excessive capital investment
in this sector."0 3
profit firms in this regard, see M. MENDELSON, TENDER LOVING GREED 195-212 (1974).
100. See p. 61 supra.
101. See Clark, supra note 58, at 1459-62; Hansmann, supra note 2, at 866-68.
102. The perception that the hospital industry is overcapitalized was a major stimulus to the
passage of the National Health Planning and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat.
2225, codified with amendments at 42 U.S.C. § 300m and scattered sections (West Supp. 1981). The
Senate committee that endorsed passage of that Act noted that "[t]here is convincing evidence from
many sources that overbuilding of facilities has occurred in many areas . . .. [B]y 1975, over 67,000
unneeded hospital beds will be in operation throughout the United States." S. REP. NO. 93-1285, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7842, 7878-79. Similar findings
were made by the Senate committee in endorsing strengthening amendments to the Act in 1979. S.
REP. NO. 96-96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1306,
1358 ("[T]here are at least 130,000 unneeded hospital beds throughout the United States.") The Act
itself states that "[t]he Congress finds that. . . there is duplication and excess supply of certain health
services and facilities, particularly in the case of inpatient health services." 42 U.S.C. § 300k-2(b)(1)
(Supp. III 1979).
103. Clark, supra note 58, argues that nonprofit hospitals offer no apparent efficiency advantages
over their proprietary counterparts, and that legal rules that have the effect of subsidizing the non-
profit as opposed to the for-profit form should be made neutral with respect to these two organiza-
tional forms. He argues, in particular, that property tax exemption should be denied to nonprofit
hospitals, but does not discuss exemption of nonprofit hospitals from corporate income taxation. Id. at
1473-77.
As the discussion offered here in the text suggests, it is not entirely easy to fashion corporate income
taxation so that it is "neutral" between the nonprofit and for-profit forms of organization. In particu-
lar, the corporate income tax is not necessarily made neutral between these two organizational forms
simply by denying an exemption to nonprofits. If the nonprofits in the industry in question are inef-
ficiently capital constrained, extending the corporate income tax to nonprofits on the same terms as it
is applied to for-profits may seriously aggravate this handicap. On the other hand, the reverse is true
if for some reason (as may be the case in the hospital industry) capital accumulation among nonprofit
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C. The Significance of For-Profit Competitors
The preceding analysis throws some light on an issue that has long
been a source of confusion in the administration of the exemption for non-
profits: the relevance of the fact that a nonprofit competes with for-profit
firms providing similar services. Such competition is frequently cited as a
justification for denying exemption. For example, in sustaining the recent
refusal of the IRS to grant an exemption to a nonprofit consulting firm,
the Tax Court relied on the fact that the firm's business was "of the sort
which is ordinarily carried on by commercial ventures organized for
profit," and remarked that the firm was "in competition with commercial
businesses."'4 "Competition with commercial firms," said the Court, "is
strong evidence of the predominance of non-exempt commercial pur-
poses."'' 0 Yet, as at least one court has noted,' 6 the mere fact that a firm
competes with for-profit suppliers of the same service cannot be sufficient
to justify denial of exemption, since many types of organizations that have
long benefited from the exemption, including hospitals, schools, nursing
homes, and day care centers, regularly engage in such competition.' 7
From the discussion above of the dynamics of competition between non-
profit and for-profit firms, it should be clear that the mere presence or
absence of for-profit competitors should not be determinative in awarding
exemption to a nonprofit. As we have seen, it is quite possible that non-
profit firms, even though less efficient than their for-profit counterparts,
could completely take over an industry.'08 Conversely, in industries in
which demand is expanding rapidly one might expect to see a large pro-
portion of for-profit firms even if they are less efficient than nonprofits,
simply because the nonprofits cannot obtain the capital necessary for rapid
expansion. It follows that, in determining whether nonprofit firms in a
given industry should have the benefit of the exemption, there is no alter-
native to inquiring directly into the role that the nonprofit firms play in
that industry. If it seems likely that the nonprofit form represents a rea-
sonable response to problems of market failure in that industry, then ex-
firms has already exceeded the efficient level. (Note, too, that to some extent the same observations
apply to exemption from property taxation, which is itself a form of subsidy to capital accumulation.)
104. B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 358 (1978).
105. Id. See also Federation Pharmacy Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 625 F.2d 804, 809 (8th Cir.
1980) (exemption denied a nonprofit pharmacy on grounds that, inter alia, "it is engaged in competi-
tion with for-profit pharmacies"); People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 923,
931 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 839 (1964) (fact that nonprofit resort was "in active competition
with other such businesses" cited among reasons for denying exemption).
106. Metropolitan Detroit Area Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 857, 861 (E. D.
Mich. 1978).
107. For example, roughly 75% of all nursing homes in the United States are proprietary. Never-
theless, nonprofit nursing homes, even when (as is commonly the case) they are operated as commer-
cial entrepreneurial nonprofits, have been exempted from income taxation. See note 16 supra.
108. See p. 83 supra.
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emption is warranted under the relative efficiency test suggested above. If,
alternatively, the nonprofit firms seem to serve no function that cannot be
served as well or better by proprietary firms, then the case for exemption
fails.
In short, the right question to ask in deciding whether to grant an ex-
emption is whether the same service could be provided as well by for-
profit firms. The presence of for-profit competitors may well provide evi-
dence in such an inquiry. It is wrong, on the other hand, simply to in-
quire whether the nonprofit firms in question are in competition with for-
profit firms, since in the presence of market failure competition alone can-
not be relied upon to sort out the efficient from the inefficient firms.
D. Redistribution and the Provision of Public Goods
The analysis so far has focused on the existence of contract failure as a
prerequisite to granting income tax exemption to nonprofit firms in any
given industry. We must now ask whether there are other, independent
justifications for granting the exemption. In particular, if a nonprofit or-
ganization provides services that redistribute wealth in a socially desirable
manner (as by aiding the poor), or that are public goods in some other
important respect, does this in itself justify exemption, quite apart from
questions of contract failure?
Note, to begin with, that most nonprofits that provide aid to the poor or
other public goods are donative nonprofits, and thus presumably operate
under cirumstances of substantial contract failure." 9 The exemption can,
therefore, be justified for such organizations on that basis alone.110
Suppose, however, there were a commercial nonprofit that sold to the
poor goods or services, such as food or housing, that were not character-
ized by contract failure. Would the exemption be justified for such an
organization if society felt that such services should be subsidized for the
poor? Perhaps, but the case is not a strong one, for in these circumstances
there would be no reason to confine the subsidy to nonprofit firms. Indeed,
in the absence of contract failure it might be inefficient to provide a selec-
tive subsidy to nonprofit providers, since they might well be less efficient
than their for-profit competitors."'
Similar logic applies to other privately sold services that, for some rea-
109. See p. 87 supra.
110. Note, too, that the second criterion for exemption offered in Section IX.B-the current ex-
tent of capital investment-is also likely to be satisfied for nonprofit organizations engaging in socially
desired production of public goods. The mere fact that greater production of these goods is considered
socially desirable indicates that they are presently being supplied at a suboptimal level, which in turn
suggests that there is probably too little investment, from an efficiency point of view, in the capital
facilities necessary to produce them.
111. See p. 87 supra.
The Yale Law Journal
son (such as the presence of public good attributes), are likely to be under-
supplied unless subsidized. Vaccinations and, perhaps, vocational educa-
tion are examples of such services." 2 Absent contract failure, there seems
no reason to have -a subsidy targeted particularly at nonprofit producers
-much less a subsidy that is designed to be proportional to retained
earnings.
E. How Strong a Rationale?
It should be emphasized that, even if the exemption were administered
more in accordance with the policy guidelines suggested above, it would
remain an extremely crude mechanism for dealing with problems of capi-
tal formation in the nonprofit sector. ' Thus, the strength of the capital
subsidy rationale for the exemption should not be overstated. All that is
being argued here is that (1) this rationale is the best justification that can
be given for the exemption, and (2) it is an adequate rationale for the
exemption in that, so long as the categories of organizations that qualify
for the exemption are intelligently delineated, on the whole we are proba-
bly better off with the exemption than without it.
X. Some Unexamined Issues
The preceding analysis has assumed that a nonprofit's net earnings will
always be reinvested in production of the basic services that the organiza-
tion was formed to provide. If a nonprofit chooses to invest some of its net
income in other unrelated industries with the aim of deriving profits that
are to be used for financing the nonprofit's basic services only at some
point in the future, new issues arise. Thus, simple conclusions cannot be
drawn directly, on the basis of the preceding analysis, concerning the wis-
112. Vocational education may be undersupplied (or, rather, underconsumed) as a result of obsta-
des facing prospective students in borrowing against their future incomes. Cf Hansmann, supra note
2, at 859-62 (discussing imperfections in loan markets for higher education).
113. The federal government could presumably use devices other than tax exemption to help alle-
viate capital shortages confronting nonprofits. Capital grants, loans, or loan guarantees, for example,
would provide a much more direct response to the problem. Such devices have, in fact, sometimes been
used. Capital grants were provided to hospitals from the 1940's until the 1970's under the Hill-
Burton program. See THE NATION'S HEALTH FACILITIES, TEN YEARS OF THE HILL-BURTON HOSPI.
TAL AND MEDICAL FACILITIES PROGRAM, 1946-56 (Public Health Service Pub. No. 616, 1958). Simi-
larly, capital grants, loans, and loan guarantees have been provided to nonprofit health maintenance
organizations under the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§300e-2 to 300e-
8 (1974 & 1981 Supp.). Devices of this sort might well be superior to tax exemption as a means of
allocating capital to the nonprofit sector-though such bureaucratic mechanisms for distributing capi-
tal can be quite costly to administer and are subject to constraints and influences that may result in an
allocation that is far from efficient.
In any case, the question at hand is not whether it might be possible to design a mechanism for
allocating capital to the nonprofit sector that would be superior to tax exemption, but whether, given
that no such alternative mechanism is in place, granting tax exemption to certain classes of nonprofits
is better policy than not granting such exemption.
92
Vol. 91: 54, 1981
Nonprofits and the Income Tax
dom of the current policy of taxing, at corporate rates, the income that
nonprofits derive from such investments in unrelated industries. On the
other hand, the analysis offered here provides an appropriate starting
point for viewing this issue.14
Further, this analysis of income tax exemption does not extend directly
to the exemption of nonprofits from other types of taxes, such as property
taxes and sales taxes. Since exemptions from these latter taxes actually
have the effect, in contrast to income tax exemption, of reducing factor
costs at the margin for nonprofits below the marginal costs facing for-
profit firms, such exemptions have subsidy effects that are not to be found
with the income tax exemption. The capital subsidy justification offered
here for exemption from the corporate income tax can be extended, how-
ever, at least in general terms, to exemption from property taxation.
XI. Mutual Nonprofits
The discussion so far has proceeded on the implicit assumption that the
nonprofit organizations in question are "entrepreneurial" nonprofits;"'
that is, are under the control of managers who are relatively autonomous.
The great majority of nonprofits of any financial significance are, in fact,
of this type. In particular, it is quite common for ultimate authority over
the affairs of a nonprofit corporation to be vested, by the corporation's
charter, in a board of directors that is self-perpetuating and responsible to
no other group.
Some nonprofits, however, are formed as membership organizations in
which the board of directors is elected by the organization's patrons (that
is, the individuals who are the ultimate source of the organization's in-
come: customers in the case of commercial nonprofits, and donors in the
case of donative nonprofits). Such membership organizations are conve-
niently referred to as "mutual" nonprofits, to distinguish them from en-
trepreneurial nonprofits." 6
A. Do Mutual Nonprofits Raise Special Issues?
In general, the analysis offered throughout this Article applies to mu-
tual as well as to entrepreneurial nonprofits. This is particularly true of
donative mutual nonprofits, such as the National Audubon Society; the
mere fact that the donors who support the Society also have voting control
114. Investments in unrelated businesses provide another mechanism, in addition to that discussed
at pp. 78-79 supra, by which the managers of a nonprofit can trade off present for future production
of the nonprofit's services. The rate at which such investments are taxed governs the terms of that
tradeoff.
115. The term derives from the classification introduced in Hansmann, supra note 2, at 840-42.
116. For a general discussion of mutual nonprofits, see id. at 841-42, 890-94.
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over it does not appear to give the Society notably better access to capital
than, say, the March of Dimes, which is an entrepreneurial donative non-
profit. The same is true of many mutual commercial nonprofits. For ex-
ample, Consumers Union is essentially a mutual commercial nonprofit; its
income comes entirely from the sale of Consumer Reports magazine and
other items that it publishes, and control over the organization is lodged in
the magazine's subscribers, who have the authority to elect the board of
directors. Yet it is not obvious that, simply because Consumers Union is a
mutual nonprofit, it has better (or worse) access to capital than does the
National Geographic Society, another commercial nonprofit publisher
(which derives most of its income from the publication of National Geo-
graphic magazine), but one that happens to be organized as an en-
trepreneurial rather than as a mutal nonprofit.
To be sure, there are some types of commercial mutual nonprofits for
which the capital constraint justification for income tax exemption seems
weakened simply because the organizations in question are mutual rather
than entrepreneurial nonprofits. Social clubs, such as country clubs, pro-
vide an example. The members of such clubs are often themselves a rea-
sonably adequate source of capital. The members frequently have a long-
standing relationship with the club, use the club's facilities relatively
intensively, and are involved in the governance of the club. Thus they are
presumably more likely to see the need for, and to be willing to respond
to, the club's need for capital contributions through initiation fees, special
assessments, or dues in excess of what is needed to meet annual operating
costs.
Such reasoning is arguably sufficient to justify denying tax exemption
to social clubs and similar organizations. Yet it is probably unnecessary to
rely heavily on the persuasiveniess of this logic alone in assessing the wis-
dom of granting tax exemption in such cases. Social clubs and related
organizations are anomalies of a sort in the world of nonprofits. The ser-
vices that they provide do not seem to be characterized by contract failure,
and hence they do not seem to need the strict nondistribution constraint
that properly characterizes the nonprofit form." 7 In many or most cases,
in fact, they would arguably be organized more appropriately as consumer
cooperatives,' which do not suffer from handicaps in obtaining capital of
the same severity as those that confront nonprofits.' 9 It follows that in-
come tax exemption could appropriately be denied to nonprofit social
117. See id. at 892-94.
118. See Hansmann, supra note 12, at 587-95.
119. For example, cooperative corporations, in contrast to nonprofit corporations, typically have
the authority to sell shares of capital stock upon which dividends can be paid, although there is
usually a statutory ceiling on the rate of return that can be paid on such stock. See Hansmann, supra
note 2, at 889.
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clubs on the ground that they fail the test of relative efficiency suggested
in Section IX.B. That is, nonprofit corporations are not conspicuously
more efficient producers of the services typically provided by social clubs
than are cooperative corporations (or perhaps even business corporations),
and therefore nothing is gained by granting them an exemption from in-
come taxation in order to help overcome the capital constraints they must
face when utilizing the nonprofit corporate form.
Under current law, contrary to the position suggested here, income tax
exemption is extended to social clubs and various similar mutual commer-
cial nonprofits.12 This contrasts with the treatment afforded cooperatives,
which, in general, are taxed like ordinary business corporations. 12
B. Mutual Nonprofits and Cooperatives as Household Production
Although Bittker and Rahdert also consider nonprofits such as social
clubs to be analogous to consumer cooperatives, they conclude from this
analogy that both social clubs and ordinary consumer cooperatives should
be exempted from income taxation. 22 Their argument, in essence, is that
in such organizations individuals are simply banding together to provide
services for themselves collectively. Since we do not tax individuals on
household production that they use directly for their personal consump-
tion, such as leisure activity and home-grown vegetables, it is inconsistent
to levy a tax on the proceeds resulting when individuals band together, in
a nonprofit or a cooperative corporation, to produce services for them-
selves. In other words, if we do not tax an individual on the (imputed)
return he receives from his private backyard tennis court, why should we
levy a tax on the proceeds from a tennis club that he and his neighbors
form? Is not such a club just an extended form of household protection?
There is some force to this argument. So long as we tax the nonprofit
or cooperative club, we create a bias in favor of individual household pro-
duction in contrast to provision of the same service through mutual orga-
nizations that may well be more efficient. However, a similar argument
cuts the other way. For as long as we exempt, say, tennis clubs organized
as nonprofit or cooperative corporations, we create a bias in favor of ten-
nis clubs that are organized in this fashion as opposed to tennis clubs that
are organized as proprietary businesses. But it is not immediately appar-
ent that there is a principled reason for imposing a tax on the return to
capital in a tennis club in which the investors of capital and the customers
120. I.R.C. § 501(c)(7).
121. I.R.C. §§ 1381-1388. Patronage dividends are, however, deductible by a cooperative in figur-
ing its taxable income, evidently on the theory that such dividends simply constitute a refund of part
of the price paid for the organization's services. Id. § 1382.
122. Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 1, at 348-53, 358.
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are different people (as is likely to be the case if the club is formed as a
business corporation), but not when the investors of capital and the cus-
tomers are the same group of people (as is likely to be the case if the club
is organized as a (mutual) nonprofit corporation or as a cooperative
corporation).
C. Tax Bias In General
The essence of the problem here, of course, is that our current system of
federal income taxation imposes differential burdens on productive activity
according to the way in which that activity is organized. Household pro-
duction is taxed differently than production undertaken through proprie-
torships and partnerships, and the latter in turn is taxed differently than
production undertaken through the form of the business corporation. The
result is that the choice among these organizational forms is biased by the
tax system. If these features of the tax system are to be taken as given,
how then should we tax nonprofit (or cooperative) corporations? Any an-
swer we choose will create biases in the choice of the nonprofit form as
opposed to other legal forms for organizing activity. The argument that
runs through this Article is that it makes sense to tax nonprofits in such a
way that these biases tend to offset other allocational biases-such as im-
perfect access to capital-inherent in the organizational forms involved.
And on the basis of this principle, it has been suggested here, a case can
be made out for granting income tax exemption to many nonprofits, but
not to others-including, perhaps, social clubs.
XII. Conclusion
It has been suggested here that the exemption of nonprofit organiza-
tions from federal income taxation should not be viewed simplistically as a
subsidy for good works or as a natural consequence of the tax base to
which the corporate income tax is applied. Rather, the exemption should
be viewed in terms of its consequences for capital formation in the non-
profit sector. Seen in this light, the justification for the exemption is less
clear-cut than has commonly been supposed, though it is still possible to
rationalize current policy in this area, at least in its broad outlines.
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APPENDIX: A SIMPLE MODEL
The relatively informal discussion in the text can be illustrated and clarified by
a simple mathematical model.
Consider an industry in which for-profit firms (denoted by the superscript "f")
can produce in each period (e.g., year) i an amount Q[ of their product, using
inputs capital, K[, and labor, Lf, via a constant returns to scale production func-
tion Qf = F(Kf, Lf). Assume also, for simplicity, that the capital-labor ratio for
this technology is fixed at Kf/L--k. 12 Nonprofit firms in this industry (denoted
by the superscript "n") produce according to the same fixed-proportions technol-
ogy except that for such firms Q1,1 = y F(K4}, L4), where 'Y may be greater or
less than unity (i.e., nonprofit firms may produce more or less efficiently than for-
profit firms). The factor '7 here is intended to reflect the balance of (a) the ad-
vantages that nonprofits may have over for-profit firms due to contract failure,
and (b) the special disadvantages that nonprofits may suffer due to, for example,
the reduced incentives for cost minimization that derive from the inability of the
organizations' managers to appropriate the resulting cost savings.
The industry's product sells at a price Pi that is a declining function of the
total industry output from nonprofit and for-profit firms, denoted by Qi- Labor
must be paid a (constant) wage w by both nonprofit and for-profit firms. Capital,
which does not depreciate, must be compensated at an annual rate of at least r if
it is obtained in the market. For-profit firms obtain all of their capital in the form
of equity rather than debt.12 4
Assume that nonprofit firms cannot obtain capital on the market in the form of
either debt or equity. Rather, each nonprofit firm begins with an initial endow-
ment of gift capital, upon which it need pay no return. Thereafter, a nonprofit
firm can obtain additional capital only by purchasing it with the firm's net earn-
ings. The price of capital is assumed to be unity. Thus, if a nonprofit begins year
i with a capital endowment K1, it can increase its capital stock at the end of year
i by an amount
dK'I= PiQ'i - wL) = PliQl - wK /k.
The capital available to the firm in year i+1 will then be Ki+ 1 Kll + dK}.
123. With these assumptions, the production function F(K,L) here has the form F(K,L) =
min[cK, flL], where ct and , are constants satisfying fl/= k.
124. This assumption is not entirely harmless. If for-profit firms are able to obtain all of their
capital, or simply their marginal capital, in the form of debt, then the corporate income tax will have
no effect on the before-tax rate of return that the firms must earn on their capital, since interest
payments on debt are deductible under the corporate income tax. In this case, the corporate tax be-
comes a tax, not on the return to capital, but rather on pure profits earned by corporations (or per-
haps on entrepreneurship, or on the efficiencies provided by the corporate form as opposed to other
business forms that are not subject to the tax). This is essentially the argument offered by Stiglitz,
supra note 10.
The model developed here and the discussion that appears at p. 77 supra remains valid so long
as equity investment is necessary simply to obtain marginal capital-i.e., so long as a firm cannot
obtain 100% debt financing. Presumably the arguments in note 67 supra concerning the impracticabil-
ity of 100% debt financing apply to for-profit as well as nonprofit firms, and, therefore, it is not
unreasonable to assume that this is the case.
In any case, as discussed in Section VIII.E supra, the basic conclusions are not affected if we accept
Stiglit2's view of the corporate income tax (as applied to for-profit firms) as a tax only on pure profits.
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Because a nonprofit cannot distribute its net earnings, and because here, as in the
text, we shall ignore the possibility that a nonprofit might invest its net earnings
in the securities of other firms (e.g., build an endowment), it follows that a non-
profit has no alternative but to spend its net earnings on additions to its capital
stock.
The managers of nonprofit firms operate the firms in a fashion that maximizes
an objective function U = U(Qy, Q, . . .), with aU/8Q'I > 0 for all i. Any
objective function of this type will generate the same behavior for the nonprofit
firms in this model, since the assumption of a fixed capital-labor ratio eliminates
the opportunity for trading off lower production in one period for greater produc-
tion in another. This implies that the "indirect effects" of exemption discussed in
the text do not show up in this model.12 1
A. For-Profit Firms Only
Consider first a competitive industry in which there are only for-profit firms. If
there are no taxes, then the industry will expand to the point where
PQi PiQf = PiF(K[,L) = wL[ + rKf,
which is the efficient level of production. If, alternatively, returns to (equity) cap-
ital and pure profits are taxed at a rate t, as under the corporate income tax, then
the industry will expand only to the point where rKf = (PiQf - wLD) (l-t), and
hence PiF(Kf,Lf) = wL[ + [r/(l-t)]Kf.
B. Nonprofit Firms Only
Consider now an industry in which there are only nonprofit firms. In the
absence of taxes, and because capital does not depreciate, the firms will expand
until the price for their service has dropped to the point where PiQi = PiQ n -
Pi'7 F(Kn,L) = wL. That is, the price falls to the point at which capital earns
a zero net rate of return, and there is excessive production of Qi, given the non-
profits' production function.
Alternatively, if nonprofits are taxed on their net earnings at a rate t, they will
still expand production to the point where net earnings are zero, i.e., where PiQQ
= wL n. With the tax, however, the firms will expand to this point at a rate that
is only (l-t) as rapid as it would be in the absence of the tax.
C. Both Nonprofit and For-Profit Firms
Finally, consider an industry that initially is populated only by for-profit firms,
and that is operating at the for-profit equilibrium price Pi that satisfies the
condition.
(1) PiF(K[, L = wLf + [r/(l-t)]K[.
Suppose, then, that a nonprofit firm seeks to enter the industry. In order to
125. See p. 78 & note 75 supra.
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survive and grow, the nonprofit, whether it is tax exempt or not, must be able to
more than cover its labor costs at the prevailing market price Pi for its product.
That is, it must be the case that, for the nonprofit,
(2) Pi Y F(K% L,1) > wL'I
Will (2) be satisfied at the market price Pi determined by (1)? Given the as-
sumption of fixed factor proportions (Ki/L i = k for both nonprofit and for-profit
firms) and constant returns to scale, condition (1) must hold for the factor
amounts (KII, Li) used by the nonprofit firm, so that we have
(3) PiF(Kni, L1) = wL'I + [r/(-t)]Kn .
Solving (3) for i and substituting into (2), we have
(4) "YwL') +T[r/(l-t)]Kn1) > wL.
Setting LQ = KnI/k, we see that (4) will be satisifed if and only if
"Y- 1 -rk
(l-t)w
Because the right-hand side of (5) is negative, this condition obviously holds if
'y>l, i.e., if the nonprofit is more efficient than the for-profit firms. It also holds,
however, for a range of values of' 7less than unity. Moreover, the higher the tax
rate t, the lower the level of efficiency 7 at which the nonprofit can survive and
grow.
Note that if condition (5) is satisfied, nonprofit firms will continue to expand
until they have driven Pi below the level Pi that satisfies (1). For-profit firms
will then suffer losses and leave the industry, which will continue to expand, with
only nonprofit firms, to the all-nonprofit equilibrium point where Pi F(Kj,L n)
= wL'i.
3. Policy Implications
In this simple model, the exemption of nonprofit organizations from taxation
leaves the long-run competitive equilibrium between nonprofit and for-profit
firms unchanged. The result of the exemption is simply to allow nonprofit firms
to expand more quickly toward their long-run equilibrium.
The efficient level of development for nonprofit firms in any industry, whether
or not they face for-profit competitors, is roughly that point at which their return
to capital equals the opportunity cost of diverting that capital from the (presuma-
bly dominant) profit-seeking sector. That point is, if 7 1, where
(6) Pi'YF(K,Lr1) = wL + [r/(l-t)]KnI.
If 'y <1, the efficient level of output from nonprofits is zero. This corresponds to
a level of output for nonprofits that is typically less than the output in their long-
run equilibrium.
The efficient policy, therefore, is to grant exemption to nonprofits only in in-
dustries in which (a)7> 1 (i.e., nonprofit firms are more efficient than for-profit
firms), and (b) the level of output among nonprofits falls short of the output level
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that satisfies condition (6).
Of course, these conclusions are to some extent dependent upon the various
restrictive assumptions that have been used in this model, such as a fixed capital/
labor ratio, the unavailability of debt capital, and so forth. The consequences of
relaxing these assumptions are explored in the text and footnotes of the body of
the article.
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